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Fair Use and the Digital Distribution of Music - Recording Industry Association of
America v. Napster, Inc.
(A comparative analysis of a restraint on copyright in the United States ofAmerica
and Trinidad and Tobago)
EVTRODUCTION
In the United States, the global reach of the internet, combined with improvements
in digital technology, have had a significant impact upon the distribution of online music
and the intellectual property rights of the main stakeholders in the music industry. For the
record labels, music publishers, online retailers, artists, and other industry participants, the
all-embracing arm of the internet facilitates increased financial rewards. As in other areas
of commerce, the internet has created a new arena to conduct the business of distributing
and marketing music, namely cyberspace.' In this new arena, traditional walk-in retailers
of music are expanded to include online retailing, online promotion of artists, and online
merchandising to a worldwide audience. The financial rewards appear boundless.
But financial rewards are not the only gains to be obtained in the new
technological dispensation. For at least two of the main stakeholders in the music
industry, the artist and the consumer, the internet and new digital technologies have also
had an equalizing eiBFect. Artists can easily become entrepreneurs, distributors and
retailers, while consumers can bypass traditional retailers and actively control the manner
' Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree 79 (First Anchor Books 2000) (1999).
1
2in which they obtain music, including whether or not they choose to pay for the music that
they obtain. For the "unlabeled" artist seeking to expose his music, or the established
artist determined to rid himself of the contractual and licensing obligations imposed by his
record label, the new technological order affords him the opportunity to become a record
producer and distributor of his product directly to the consumer. A major benefit of such
direct marketing to the consumer is the potential minimizing and/or elimination of costs
associated with obtaining a third party producer and distributor.
The internet-using consumer has also profited fi"om technological advances as
perfect quality music can be downloaded in the comfort of the home, often at little or no
cost, for permanent retention. With such shifting economic dynamics, there has been a
mushrooming of litigation as the boundaries of copyright law are tested when faced with
the challenges ofnew and improved technologies.
One of the most recent cases in which fiindamental copyright doctrines clashed
with new technology is the case of A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.^ While the
District Court and Ninth Circuit decisions have been hailed by some as a triumph for
copyright owners, the case illustrates the widening chasm between copyright holders and
users of copyrighted works, as technology unrelentingly erodes cherished monopolies.
The judicial approach adopted in the Napster litigation mirrors the growing trend of U.S.
policymakers to strengthen copyright interests in response to technological developments.
1 14 F.Supp.2d 896 (N. D. Cal. 2000) and Nos. 00-16401, 00-16403, 2001 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 2001).
3It is suggested that one fall-out from such an approach is the whittling away of a
traditional limitation on copyright's protective scheme, the Fair Use doctrine.
The purpose of this Thesis is to undertake a critical analysis of the Napster
judgment and its treatment of the doctrine of fair use, to determine whether the doctrine
can retain its integrity in the internet age. It is proposed that as technology advances, U.S.
policymakers are moving away from the constitutional objectives of U.S. copyright law
and are equating copyright interests with property rights, to the detriment of non-
commercial users of copyrighted works. Further, it is suggested that the decision in the
Napster litigation is important for the evolving landscape of U.S. copyright law, as it
signals the difficulty in establishing a fair use of a copyrighted work, when such use is not
authorized by the copyright owner.
While the main focus of this Thesis is an analysis of U.S. copyright law, a brief
review of copyright law in Trinidad and Tobago is undertaken for comparative purposes.
In Trinidad and Tobago, the impact of new digital technologies has not been as dramatic
for the recording industry and industry participants as it has been in the U.S., primarily
because the internet is not widely utilized as a distribution outlet for that country's music.
Unlike the U.S. position, the fair use doctrine does not exist in the copyright law of
Trinidad and Tobago. However, there are recognized limitations on the exclusive rights
of the copyright holder, one of which is the permitted, unauthorized use of a copyrighted
work for "personal purposes".
4This Thesis will also seek to examine whether this limitation on copyright in the Trinidad
and Tobago legislation is relevant in the online world of digital music downloading.
Chapter I of this Thesis is divided into two sections. The first section will suggest
a few of the economic factors which may have influenced the Napster litigation. This
section will highlight the dollar value of the music industry, the major beneficiaries of the
economic gains to be made fi"om the industry, and the financial interests at stake. The
second section will identify recent improvements made in digital technology and the
impact such improvements have had on vested economic interests.
Chapter II will describe the statutory fi-amework on which copyright holders rely,
while Chapter III will focus on the District Court and Ninth Circuit decisions in the
Napster litigation, and their treatment of the fair use doctrine. As part of this analysis,
select Supreme Court and other judicial decisions will be examined to see whether the
treatment of the fair use doctrine in the Napster litigation was consistent with established
authorities. In the Trinidad and Tobago context, the concept of "personal purposes" will
be discussed and relevant English judicial decisions interpreting the concept will be
highlighted. Chapter IV will consider the future of the fair use doctrine and the treatment
of the concept in legislation specifically drafted as a response to the internet age.
It is to be emphasized that this Thesis is not intended to provide an in-depth
exposition of copyright law or its limitations, in either the U.S. or Trinidad and Tobago.
Instead, it is intended that this work will provide a provocative analysis of a judicial
decision that is significant for its influence far beyond the limits of music distribution, as it
5touches upon the manner in which all types of information will be transmitted and received
over the internet.
CHAPTER I
SETTING THE STAGE - THE ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
LANDSCAPE
The Economic Landscape
The global music industry is an important revenue earner for commercial countries
across various continents, which possess the financial, technical and marketing resources,
required to construct and sustain a thriving export-oriented industry. Worldwide music
sales in 1999 have been computed at a dollar value ofUS $38.5 billion, assisted mainly by
strong consumer demand in the United States of America (the largest and most dominant
music market in the world^), countries of South East Asia, Scandinavia, parts of Eastern
Europe and Australasia."* Globally, compact disc sales rose in 1999 by 3% to 2.4 billion
units, offsetting a 7% fall in sales of music cassettes and a 4% reduction in singles sales,
with the biggest contribution to the increase in compact disc sales coming fi-om the U.S.
and Australasian markets.^ Worldwide, total sales of all music formats in 1999 were
calculated at 3.8 billion units.^
In the United States, the music industry contributed $12.5 billion to the economy
in 1997 and $12.3 billion in 1998, exclusive of the sale of music over the internet.^ In
^ http://www.ifpi.org/statistics/worIdsales.htm] (last visited Feb. 16, 2001).
'* http://www.ifpi.org/statistics/worldsales.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2001).
^ http://www.ifpi.org/statistics/worldsales.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2001).
^ http://www.ifpi.org/statistics/worldsales.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2001).
' William Sloan Coats, Vickie L. Feeman, John G. Given & Heather D. Rafter, Streaming Into the Future:
71999, sales of compact discs in the U.S. increased by more than 10% over previous years,
taking total music sales dollar growth to 19% over a two-year period.^ The huge
economic returns generated by the U.S. music industry are carved up by a number of
participants. Record labels, music publishers, artists, composers, songwriters, musicians,
retailers and distributors among others, all share in the financial rewards generated by
music sales in varying degrees. One of the chief beneficiaries of the tremendous financial
returns generated by the music industry is the powerful record label, which generally
possesses the required capital and technical resources to invest in the marketing initiatives
necessary to promote new, as well as established artists.^
Five major record labels control the global music industry: BMG Entertainment,
EMI Recorded Music, Universal Music Group, Warner Music Group and Sony Music.
These companies are known collectively as the Big Five.'° BMG Entertainment is part of
the German entertainment group of Bertelsmann AG, EMI Recorded Music is a member
of the British entertainment group, EMI Group Pic, Universal Music Group is a unit of
Canada's Seagram Co. Ltd., while Warner Music Group is a member of a U.S. media
giant.
'^
Music and Video Online, 20 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 285, 286 (2000).
^ http://www.iipi.org/statistics/wOTldsales.htinl (last visited Feb. 16, 2001).
' Coats, sitpra note 7, at 287.
'"Mat 286-87.
" Muzi.cwm: Lateline News, EMI, Warner in Global Music Merger, (Jan. 24, 2000), available at
http://news.muzi.eom/l l/english/56941.shtml Oast visited Apr. 2, 2001).
8It has been estimated that worldwide, the Big Five control approximately 80 % of
the popular music industry.'^ These major record companies can serve a dual role by also
acting as music publishers," or mclude music publishing afiBliate companies as part of their
corporate structure. A music publisher can serve as a liaison between an artist and a
record label, and may also act as a marketing agent for the artist's music. In
compensation, the music publisher can receive 33% to 50% of the royalties on each
compact disc or record sold.^'* The record label also provides marketing and promotion
services for its group of artists, for which it is compensated by being assigned part of the
artist's economic rights, the copyright.*^ The combined efforts of the music publisher and
record label allow the record company to recover most of its investment costs in
promoting, marketing and distributing the work ofan artist.'^
On January 24, 2000, the Big Five seemed destined to be reduced to the Big Four
when Britain's EMI Group Pic. and Time Warner Inc. announced their plan to merge their
music businesses, EMI Recorded Music and Warner Music. The merged company would
have created the world's top record company to be known as Warner EMI Music, and
worth US$20 billion. This new merged company was positioned to control a global music
'^ Ccats, supra note 7, at 286.
" Wilfred Dolfema, How Will the Music Industry Weather the Globalization Storm?, First Monday,
volume 5, number 5, 6 (May 2000), available at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue5_5/dolfsma/ (last
visited Mar. 27, 2001).
"• Id. at 6.
^^ Id. at 6.
'^Id.2M.
9market share of approximately 20% with annual sales ofUS$8 billion.'^ It was also set to
control a European market share of 25%, to rival Universal Music Group as the world's
largest music publishing house, and effectively further concentrating global music
distribution in fewer hands. ^^ It was estimated that with the merger, the new Warner EMI
Music company would have about one-third of the global music publishing business.'^
The planned merger was short lived when faced with regulatory hurdles imposed
by the European Commission.^^ On October 5, 2000, it was announced by EMI and Time
Warner that the deal was scrapped.^^ Industry sources noted that the two conglomerates
could not satisfy the regulatory requirements imposed by the European Commission.^
The resuh is that the Big Five continue to dominate the world music scene.
These five major record companies and/or their affiliate music publishing
companies, among others, are members of the Recording Industry Association of America
(the RIAA), the powerful trade group which represents the U.S. recording industry.^ The
'^ Muzi.com: LatelineNews, EMI, Warner in Global Music Merger, (Jan. 24, 2000) available at
http://nevvs.muzi.coiTi/ll/english/56941.shtml (last visited Apr. 2, 2001).
'* Muzi.com: LatelineNews, EMI, Warner in Global Music Merger, (Jan. 24, 2000) available at
http://news.muzi.com/ll/english/56941.shtml (last visited Apr. 2, 2001).
'^ Don Waller, Music Marriage Looks to Future, (Warner EMI Music)(BriefArticle), Variety, (Jan. 31,
2000) available at http:// www.findarticles.com/cf_0/ml 3 12/1 1_377/5941031 1/pl/article.jhtml (last
visitedApr. 9, 2001).
^° Braden Reddall & Arindam Nag, EMI, Warner Music Merger Falls Flat, Reuters, ( Oct. 5, 2000)
available at http:// www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2637020,00.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2001).
^' Braden Reddall & Arindam Nag, EMI, Warner Music Merger Falls Flat, Reuters, ( Oct. 5, 2000)
available at http:// www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2637020,00.html Oast visited Apr. 9, 2001).
^^ Braden Reddall & Arindam Nag, EMI, Warner Music Merger Falls Flat, Reuters, ( Oct. 5, 2000)
available at, http:// www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2637020,00.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2001).
" http://www.riaa.com /About-Who.cfin (last visited Apr. 1, 2001).
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RIAA is composed of legitimate record companies with main offices situated in the United
States, which are engaged in producing and selling recordings under their individual label
for home use.^"* Eligibility for membership is barred to companies which are currently
engaged in the unauthorized creation, distribution, sale or importation of sound recordings
in violation of U.S. law, or have been so engaged within five years of application or are
controlled by persons or other entities that have been so engaged.^^
Membership in the RIAA is open strictly to corporate entities, and there are more
than 700 corporate members which promote and produce all genres of music covering
such formats as popular music, latin, rap, country, urban, reggae, religious, jazz, rhythm
and blues, among others.^^
Included in the RIAA membership are the record label plaintiffs in the Napster
litigation,^^ namely, A&M Records, Inc., Geffen Records, Inc., Interscope Records, Sony
Music Entertainment, Inc., MCA Records, Inc., Atlantic Recording Corporation, Island
Records, Inc., Motown Records Company L.P., Capitol Records, La Face Records, BMG
Music d/b/a The RCA Records Label, Universal Records Inc., Elektra Entertainment
Group Inc., Arista Records, Inc., Sire Records Group, Inc., Polygram Records, Inc.,
Virgin Records America, Inc., and Warner Bros. Records, Inc.^^
^^ http://www.riaa.com/About-Meinbers-3.cfiii Oast visited Apr. 1, 2001).
^^ http://www.riaa.com/About-Members-3.cfin (last visited Apr. 1, 2001).
^^ http:// www.riaa.com/About-Members-l.cfin (last visited Apr. 1, 2001).
"A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 1 14 F.Supp.2d 896 (N.D. Cal., 2000).
^* http:// www.riaa.com/About-Members-l.cfin (last visited Apr. 1, 2001).
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The RIAA's mission statement provides that its objective is "to foster a business
and legal climate that supports and promotes our members' creative and financial
vitality."^^ It can be argued that the mission statement implies that as a trade group, the
RIAA is concerned primarily with protecting the creative and economic rights of its
corporate members, the financial mainstay of the music business. As the RIAA does not
offer individual or associate membership,^^ an individual artist, composer, songwriter or
musician is disqualified fi"om becoming a member of, and being represented by the trade
group in its lobbying efforts, unless he is affiliated to one of its corporate members, such
as a record label or music publishing firm, and such company acts on his behalf
This state of affairs has led some in the music industry, including new online music
retailers and distributors not affiliated to established record labels, to view the RIAA with
distrust. These new online participants contend that the trade group pays lip service to
protecting the intellectual property interests of artists, while in reality, it concentrates on
garnering the lion's share of the spoils of the music industry for its corporate members.^'
The member companies of the RIAA, assisted mainly by the Big Five, control
approximately 90% of legitimate sound recordings produced and sold in the United
^' http:// www.riaa.com/About-Who.cfiii (last visited Apr. 1, 2001).
'° http://www.riaa.com/About-Members-3.cfin (last visited Apr. 1, 2001).
^' Robert MacMillan, MP3.com Blasts RIAA At High Volume, 10/12/98 Newsbyte,
1998 WL 20717326. "...the (online music) market is already well underway, and ..just because (the RIAA)
is not controlling it, it does not mean that it does not exist and is not flourishing - legitimately. The music
industry has chosen to sit on the sidelines and do nothing up to present. The train has already left the
station. Now, they want to derail it. None of the 'A's' in RIAA stand for 'artists.' They support the
recOTd industry." - Michael Robertson - President ofMP3.com.
12
States.^^ With such a strong grip on the U.S. music industry, it is not unreasonable to
assume that any threat to the "financial vitality" of these record label member companies
and their aflSliates, would be a source of disquiet to both the individual member companies
and the RIAA representative body.
The members of the RIAA typically control the sale and distribution of sound
recordings by selling their music products directly to large retailers or large distributors,
which in turn sell to local retailers and then on to the consumer at the end of the chain.^^
Apart fi-om the established record labels, there are independent record labels^ which
provide an alternative distribution channel, on a smaller scale, for an artist to get his music
to the consumer. The independent labels do not have the financial resources to encroach
upon the domination of the music industry by the established major record labels,^^ but
they afford an option to artists who might be unable or unwilling to secure a recording
contract with an established record label.
The huge earnings generated by the U.S. music industry can be contrasted with the
modest earnings produced by the fledgling music industry of Trinidad and Tobago, a twin-
island republic located in the Caribbean and comprised of approximately 1 .294 million
people.^^ In Trinidad and Tobago, the entertainment industry ranks sixth in the economy
^^ http://www.riaa.com/About-Who.cfiii (last visited Apr. 1, 2001).
'^ William Sloan Coats, Vickie L. Feeman, John G. Given & Heather D. Rafter, Streaming into the
Future: Music and Video Online, 20 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 285, 286-87 (2000).
^^ Id. at 287.
^^ Id. at 287.
^* http://www.central-bank.org.tt/md/statistics/data/eco^ance.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2001).
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with respect to foreign exchange eamings.^^ The petrochemical sector (petroleum,
petroleum products, natural gas, iron and steel, methanol and nitrogenous fertilizers)^^ is
the leading export earner.
Figures for 1995 reveal that total foreign exchange earnings for the entertainment
industry amounted to TT$253.2 million,^^ or approximately US$42.62 million."^
Merchandise sales of steelband instruments,'*' records, compact discs, cassettes and videos
earned a dollar value ofTT $2.9 million."*^ At present, the total foreign market for calypso
music"*^ (records, cassettes and compact discs) is estimated at 250,000 units annually,
while the local music market has been estimated at 30,000 to 35,000 units annually.'*^
These less than inspiring figures for the sale of calypso music internationally are made
even more difficult to reconcile with the fact that there are approximately 60 carnivals
celebrated in other Caribbean islands. North America and Europe that are patterned
" http://www.sbdc.co.tt/entertai.htm Oast visited Apr. 2, 2001).
^* http://www.visittnt.coni/General/about/econoniy.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2001).
'' http://www.sbdc.co.tt/entertai.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2001).
^ 1 Trinidad and Tobago dollar (TT$) =100 cents. A floating rate system is in force, see
http://www.visitnt.com/General/about/general.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2001). The exchange rate in 1995
was US$1 = TT$5.9466. Current exchange rate is approximately US $1 = TT$6.2998, see
http://www.central-bank.org.tt/md/statistics/data/ecojglance.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2001).
"' The steel pan (a percussion instrument) also known as pan, steelband or steel drum, was invented in the
Republic ofTrinidad and Tobago in the 1930's and is the only musical instrument to have been invented
in the 20th century. See Dr. Felix I. R Blake, The Trinidad& Tobago Steel Pan - History and Evolution
8, 20 (1st ed. ).
*^ http://www.sbdc.co.tt/entertai.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2001).
"^ Calypso music is indigenous to Trinidad and Tobago and is the music of Carnival, the popular annual
Shrovetide festival that takes place in Trinidad and Tobago just prior to the onset of Lent. Carnival in
Trinidad occurs at the same time as Carnival in Brazil and Mardi Gras in New Orleans. Carnival was
introduced to Trinidad by the French plantocracy who came around the end ofthe 1 8th century. See Dr.
Felix I. R Blake, The Trinidad & Tobago Steel Pan at 63. See also John Cowley, Carnival Canboulqy
and Calypso - Traditions in the Making (Cambridge University Press 1996).
^ http://www.sbdc.co.tt/entertai.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2001).
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directly from the Trinidad and Tobago Carnival, the popular annual pre-Lenten festival.
The more noteworthy of these Trinidad and Tobago styled foreign carnivals include
Notting Hill Carnival in England, Caribana celebrations in Toronto, Labor Day
celebrations in New York and Miami Carnival.'*^
The statistics suggest that international demand for the Trinidad and Tobago styled
Carnival does not equate with strong international sales for the calypso music which is a
fundamental component of the festival, along with steelband music. As the U.S. position
makes clear, strong music sales whether at the international or national level, require
significant marketing, promotion and distribution efforts along with the concomitant
injection of capital. There are several record labels in Trinidad and Tobago, but none
financially equipped to engage in a large scale marketing effort on behalf of its artists,
without the assistance of international distribution outlets for the local music product.'*^
Other factors which have been identified as negating against a strong music
industry in Trinidad and Tobago include: limited airplay in the domestic and regional
markets, piracy, poor product packaging, promotion and distribution, and the "lack of
export competitiveness."^^ Trinidad and Tobago artists often face immense difficulty in
"^ http://www.sbdc.co.tt/entertai.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2001).
^ In May 1999, Trinidad and Tobago hosted the Miss Universe beauty pageant and the local recording
industry was hopeful that by having representatives of a few top international record labels in the country
for the event, the local musical talent would be showcased and more artists would have the opporttinity to
export their music internationally. See Trinidad and Tobago Exporter, The Marketing Challenge,
available at http://exporter. co.tt/99may/seeing.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2001).
'*^ Rolph I.L. Warner, Getting Serious About Music, Trinidad Guardian, March 10, 2001, at 1, in an
interview with I>. Keith Nurse, lecturer in International Relations at the University ofthe West Indies, St.
Augustine campus, Trinidad.
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selling their music internationally due to the lack of interest shown by large foreign
retailers and distributors in purchasing their music products for resale.'^^ In addition, the
fact that the compact disc containing the music of a Trinidad and Tobago artist is usually
pressed, manufactured and produced outside of the country, means that the local product
retails at a higher price in the international market when compared to the product of a
foreign artist manufactured in that artist's home country, as the Trinidad and Tobago
product is considered an import in the foreign country.'*^ For example, a compact disc of
the music of a Trinidad and Tobago artist which is pressed in the U.S., is labeled as an
import by the U.S. authorities and retails in the U.S. market, (usually by Caribbean owned
record shops),^^ for approximately US$20 while a U.S. equivalent may retail between
US$12 -$15.^'
This lack of "export competitiveness," or the disparity in pricing is considered to
be a "critical area ofconcem"^^ for the Trinidad and Tobago music industry. However,
'*'' Trinidad & Tobago Exporter, The Marketing Challenge, available at
http://exporter.co.tt/99may/seeing/htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2001) - "Our music is certainly exportable,
but we simply dcHi't have the established distribution outlets for our products. We have to distribute
through small shops, mainly into the West Indian communities in New York, Toronto, London, etc.. ..the
products seldom get into the mainstream shops, like Tower Records, HMV and others." - Peter Scoon
President ofthe Recording Industry Association ofTrinidad and Tobago (RIATT).
"' Rolph l.L. Warner, Getting Serious About Music, Trinidad Guardian, March 10, 2001, at 2, in an
interview with Dr. Keith Nurse, lecturer in International Relations at the University ofthe West Indies, St.
Augustine campus, Trinidad.
'° Trinidad & Tobago Exporter, The Marketing Challenge, available at
http://exporter.co.tt/99may/seeing/htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2001).
'^ Rolph l.L. Warner, Getting Serious About Music, Trinidad Guardian, March 10, 2001, at 2, in an
interview with Dr. Keith Nurse, lecturer in International Relations at the University ofthe West Indies, St.
Augustine campus, Trinidad.
" Rolph l.L. Warner, Getting Serious About Music, Trinidad Guardian, March 10, 2001, at 2, in an
interview with Dr. Keith Nurse, lecturer in International Relations at the University ofthe West Indies, St.
Augustine campus, Trinidad.
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the reality is that an overpriced music product from an artist whose music is not widely
known, stands very little chance of being purchased by an international consumer. It
seems that the foremost hurdle facing the Trinidad and Tobago music industry is to
develop and implement an effective marketing and distribution strategy, so that its music
products can reach a larger international audience.
The use of the internet and new digital technologies as marketing tools, appear to
pose a viable alternative marketing option to seeking to lure mainstream foreign
distributors to purchase the local product for resale in the foreign market. Internet usage
is growing worldwide, and the required technology is available for both developed and
developing countries like Trinidad and Tobago.
Trinidad and Tobago has modem telecommunication links with the international
community^^ and revenues from internet, cellular and other telecommunication services
have increased from TT$83.4 million in 1997 to TT$240.2 million in 2000.^^* In addition,
a new Telecommunications Bill 2001 has been introduced to Parliament for debate,
designed to open up the telecommunications market and end the monopoly of the lone
telecommunications provider, Telecommunications Services of Trinidad and Tobago
(TSTT).^^ It is anticipated that by de-monopolizing the industry, one of the welcome
" http://wvvw.visittnt.com/General/about/economy.html (last visited on Apr. 5, 2001).
^^ Anthony Wilson & Sherry Ann Singh, Telecommunications Bill 2001, Trinidad Guardian, April 12,
2001, at 2.
^^ Anthony Wilson & Sherry Ann Singh, Telecommunications Bill 2001, Trinidad Guardian, April 12,
2001, at 1-2.
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results would be the decrease in the price of local^^ and international telephone calls,
which can pose a barrier to widespread internet usage.
However, as an examination of the U.S. position will illustrate, the problems
encountered by the copyright owners and the main stakeholders in the music industry with
respect to new internet technologies are formidable, and threaten to counteract the
benefits to be gained fi-om the widespread use of these technologies. WhUe the internet
and digital technologies have added a new dynamic to the music industry by their potential
for increasing revenues in an expanded online market, as well as offering an alternative
marketing model, the economic landscape has also been altered, arguably to the detriment
of vested interests. In addition, novel challenges to conventional legal rights are being
made.
In the U.S., it has been contended that new digital technologies threaten to
diminish the investments made in the music industry by members of the RIAA," and
permanently change the methods by which on-line music is legitimately distributed and
obtained by the consumer. While these new digital technologies have not yet made any
significant impact on the main stake-holders in the Trinidad and Tobago music industry,
primarily because of the relative unfamiliarity of the local music to the wide-spread
^* Anthony Wilson & Sherry Ann Singh, Telecommunications Bill 2001, Trinidad Guardian, April 12,
2001, at 3.
^^ William Sloan Coats, Vickie L. Feemaa, John G. Given & Heather D. Rafter, Streaming into the
Future: Music and Video Online, 20 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 285 (2000).
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international community, valuable lessons can be learned from the treatment of these
technological issues by the U.S. judicial system.
The Technological Landscape
It has been said that the internet lowers barriers to new entrants in the marketplace
by lowering costs, while it empowers consumers by giving them greater choices. ^^ In the
context ofthe U.S. music industry, this equalizing effect is significant because it challenges
the established status quo, that is, the domination of a high-stakes music industry by a few
major record labels. TTiese record labels rely on statutory protection and a controlled
model ofmusic distribution^^ to safeguard their investment.
The global nature of the internet and the growing number of users, have also
benefited new entrepreneurs, as well as the established record labels. New entrepreneurs
are enticed to become involved in the U.S. online music business as distributors and
retailers, while the established record labels can profit from increased earnings in an
expanded market. Figures for 1996 reveal that in the U.S., online sales of prerecorded
music averaged $14 million, by 1998 these sales increased to $88 million and estimates
show that fiiture sales of online music will generate close to $1 .4 billion in added revenue,
or at least 8% of all music sales.^ The number of consumers purchasing music over the
internet has also steadily increased. In 1999, the number of consumers purchasing music
'^ Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree 80 (First Anchor Books 2000) (1999).
^' Coats, supra note 57, at 285.
^ Id. at 288.
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over the internet rose to 2.4%, an increase from 1.1% in 1998. It is estimated that the
U.S. music industry will grow by about 6.2% a year through 2003, with 25% of that
growth aided by digital or internet technologies.^^
New online participants, not necessarily affiliated to any particular record label,
have seized the opportunity to become distributors of music to the global audience. It is
estimated that there are more than 80,000 music sites on the internet, offering themselves
as either retailers of prerecorded music and merchandise, fan sites and/or providers of
internet radio broadcasting, also known as webcasting.*^^ These online participants include
start up companies not aflBliated to record labels, affiliates of record labels, established
record labels, as well as enterprising artists who have embraced the chance afforded by the
new technologies to distribute their music directly to their fans without the need to use an
intermediary distributor and producer.
Websites such as Internet Underground Music Archive (lUMA), allow an artist to
create an individual website for the online sale of his prerecorded music and merchandise,
by paying a small subscription fee.^ By using such a website, the artist gains marketing,
promotion and distribution control over his creative work without recourse to the
traditional distribution sources. An increasing number of websites offering retail sales of
*' http://www.ifpi.org/statistics/worldsales.htmI (last visited March 25, 2001).
*^ Don Waller, Music Marriage Looks to Future, (Warner EMI Music)(BriefArticle), Variety, (Jan. 31,
2000) available at http:// www.findarticles.com/cf_0/ml 3 12/1 1
_377/5941 03 1 1 /pi /article.jhtml (last
visitedApr. 9, 2001).
*^ Coats, supra note 57, at 288.
" Id. at 287-88.
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music have also sprung up to cash in on the mass internet-using audience, and digital
technology is frequently used to provide online samples of music to consumers as an
enticement before making a purchase. Other online retailers and distributors include
websites such as www.emusic.com, www.musicboulevard.com, www.amazon.com,
www.mp3.com, www.towerrecords.com and www.cdnow.com.^^ These websites
facilitate online purchases, offer the ability to hear music samples,^ and generally dispense
with the need to walk into a store in order to make a purchase.
The online participants in the music industry rely primarily on two types of
technologies to promote their products to internet-using consumers: streaming media and
digital downloading.^^ Both technologies involve the transmission of digital music
recordings to internet users, however, fundamental differences between these technologies
have led to the established record labels accepting the former while condemning the latter.
Digital music recordings as contained on a compact disc, are to be contrasted with
the analog format of music recordings contained on a cassette or record, or the
transmission of a radio broadcast. The main difference between both types of recordings
is the sound quality. The sound quality of digital music recordings is said to be far
superior to the sound quality of analog recordings.^ Analog recordings and transmissions
are affected by flaws in the storage medium as well as impediments such as dust particles,
" Id. at 288.
^ Id. at 288.
^^ Id. at 288-89.
*^ Recording Industry Association ofAmerica v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1073
(9th Cir. 1999).
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which interfere with the sound quality when it is received.^^ On the other hand, the
digitization process ensures that the sound quality of the original recording maintains its
sound quality^" and integrity. The digitization process involves the translation of
information, including sound, into mathematical bits. Music is stored in computer memory
or on a compact disc or other digital software as Is and Os (the mathematical bits), and
reconverted into music when played back on digital equipment such as a computer or
compact disc player.'^
An important consequence of the difference in sound quality between analog and
digital formats is the effect on the sound quality of both authorized and illegitimate copies
made from the original recording. With respect to analog music recordings, each
successive copy made from an original cassette or record suffers in degradation in sound
quality''^ because of the vulnerability of the original recording to external factors. By
contreist, with digital recordings, there is virtually no degradation in sound quality despite
the number of copies made. The result is that multiple copies of digital recordings made
from a single original recording maintain the sound integrity as near as possible to the
original recording.^^ In the context of the internet, recent improvements in technology
used to transmit digitized music to internet users have added a troubling dimension for
^' June Chung, The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act and its Failure to Address the
Issue ofDigital Music 's New Form ofDistribution, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 1361, 1366 (1997).
™Mat 1367.
^' M at 1367.
'^ Recording Industry Association ofAmerica, 180 F.3d at 1073.
"Mat 1073.
22
owners of copyrighted music, as multiple, unauthorized copies of near perfect sound
recordings can be effortlessly, permanently, and freely obtained by consumers.
The first type of internet technology utilized by online participants to transmit
digital recordings is known as "streaming media". Streaming media is generally used in
webcasting^^ (internet radio broadcasting), or to distribute promotional samples of music
online,^^ and is the transmission of a digitized audio file to internet users so that it is
audible in real time as it is received/^ This type of technology has not unduly raised the
ire of the established recording industry leaders for two main reasons. Firstly, the internet
user is generally unable to obtain permanent copies of the audio file,^^ as streaming media
prohibits the storage, or barring a second transmission, the replaying of audio files. ^^
Secondly, the audio quality of sound recordings transmitted with the use of streaming
technology, is inferior to the quality of music contained on a compact disc.^^
It should be noted that the established industry players recognize the value of
streaming technology and utilize it for their benefit. With such technology, online samples
of music can be provided to potential consumers as a promotional tool to enhance sales.**'
^^ Wendy M. Pollack, Note, Timing In: The Future ofCopyright Protection For Online Music In The
Digital Millenium, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 2445, 2449 (2000).
^* Jef&ey D. Neuburger & Susan Israel, Music Industry Acts in Concert on Soimd Samples - Harmonious
Compromise Could Resolve Licensing Issues Arising From the Downloading ofMusic, \ 12619% NU CI 7,
(col.l).
^* See generally Neuburger, supra note 75.
^' William Sloan Coats, Vickie L. Feeman, John G. Given & Heather D. Rafter, Streaming into the
Future: Music and Video Online, 20 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 285, 288 (2000).
^* Neuburger, supra note 75.
^' Pollack, supra note 74, at 2449.
^ Neuburger, supra note 75.
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These promotional marketing strategies are routinely used by independent, internet record
labels and unsigned artists, who often sell and provide free samples of the artist's work, or
provide streamed teasers to convince internet users to purchase the sound recordings.^'
Moreover, the major record labels have been able to earn licensing fees from legitimate
websites offering samples of copyrighted music.^^ A popular streaming audio technology
company is RealNetworks. Its RealPlayer audio technology enables the user to listen to
audio in real time and can be encoded to prevent the user from copying the streamed
music. It is estimated that the RealPlayer technology has been downloaded from its
website 92 million times. ^^
Apart from the potential for financial benefits to be gained from the use of
streaming technology, the major stakeholders in the music industry are also able to
safeguard their work from unauthorized use and irtfiingement. They are able to achieve
such protection for several reasons. First, the internet user is generally unable to obtain
permanent copies of the music when streaming technology is utilized. Secondly, the
owner of the sound recording has the capacity to encode the sampled music from
unauthorized reproduction, and finally, the quality of sound enjoyed by the user when
streaming technology is utilized is inferior when compared to the sound on a compact
disc.
*' Recording Industry Association ofAmerica v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180 F.3d 1072,
1074 (9th Cir. 1999).
^ Neuburger, supra note 75.
*^ Pollack, supra note 74, at 2449.
24
Streaming technology can be contrasted with the digital downloading of music,
which allows for the permanent storage and retention of digital sound recordings. Digital
downloading requires the use ofthe more contentious technology used in the online music
industry, generically referred to as compression technology. Compression technology has
raised the ire of the RIAA and its members because the internet user can easily obtain
copyrighted sound recordings at no cost.
Compression technologies make an audio file "smaller", which allows digital audio
files to be transferred more quickly over the internet and stored more efiBciently.** The
most popular of the compression technologies is the MP3 format. ^^ The MPS format
(Motion Picture Experts Group 1 layer 3)^ was initially developed by the Moving Pictures
Experts Group to compress digital video and movie data. The MPEG, audio layer 3
(MPS) is the subsystem that compresses sound not accompanied by video.'^ To fully
appreciate the revolutionizing effect that the MPS format has had on the digital
distribution of music over the internet, and the ramifications for the established music
moguls, the format must be compared with its predecessor, the 'Svave" format.
^ Recording Industry Association ofAmerica, 180 F.3d at 1073-74.
*^ Pollack, supra note 74, at 2449.
86
Lisa M. Needham, Comment, A Day in the Life ofthe Digital Music Wars: The RIAA v. Diamond
Multimedia, 26 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1 135, 1 144 (2000).
*^ Charles L. Simmons, Jr., Digital Distribution ofEntertainment Content... The Battle Lines Are Drawn,
33 AUG Md. B.J. 31, 33 (2000).
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The music contained on a compact disc is collected in separate computer data files
known individually as a "wave file".^^ Prior to the breakthrough in compression
technologies, combined with the development of faster modems and processors for
internet access,^ the transmission of music over the internet in the wave file format to an
end user, was a slow and tedious process.^ The primary reason for the time-consuming
process was that the wave file format was too big to easily and quickly transmit music
over the intemet.^^ In other words, even though a compact disc that was 'Uploaded" to
the internet with the appropriate software for permanent and free download by another
user was possible, it was not widely favored due to the lengthy process.
Each minute of music on a compact disc in the wave format is approximately about
ten megabytes, which means that the standard length song comprises a forty to fifty
megabyte fiJe, creating a download time for such song to be a three to four hour^ chore.
As a practical matter, music sales in a conventional distribution outlet or from a legitimate
online retailer would not be drasticaUy affected by the relatively few individuals who were
willing to wait three or four hours in order to obtain a free download of a four minute-
length song.
** Id. at 33.
*' Wendy M. Pollack, Note, Timing In: The Future ofCopyright Protection For Online Music in the
Digital Millenium, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 2445, 2450 (2000).
^ Needham, supra note 86, at 11 43.
'* Recording Industry Association ofAmerica, 180 F.3d at 1073.
^ Needham, supra note 86, at 11 43.
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Conversely, the MP3 format has radically altered the face ofthe digital distribution
of music by sharply reducing the size of the music file, and by extension, increasing the
speed and eflBciency in which the music is received. The technology compresses the
computer file by removing unnecessary data.^^ However, even though the audio file
becomes "smaller", there is no significant distortion of the sound quality.^'' The computer
files are reduced by a factor of twelve to one,^^ which means that a file that was formerly
fifty megabytes in the wave format, becomes a three or four megabyte music file in the
MPS format,^ significantly decreasing the download time fi"om hours to a few minutes.^^
Apart from the compression of the computer music files, the MP3 technology is
popular because of its easy availability, its non-proprietary nature,^* and the opportunity
afforded to the user to retain permanent copies of recordings in the format. Free MP3
software applications are accessible on the internet for playing and creating MPS files^ on
digital equipment. Music can be uploaded to the internet in the MPS format for download
by others, ^^ and once downloaded, permanent copies can be retained on the user's system
and replayed at will.'^'
^^Id.at 1144.
** Recording Industry Association ofAmerica, 180 F.3d at 1074.
'* Mat 1074.
^ Needham, supra note 86, at 1 144.
'^ Recording Industry Association ofAmerica, 180 F.3d at 1074.
^* Mat 1074.
^ Needham, supra note 86, at 1 144.
'""Mat 1145.
'"' William Sloan Coats, Vickie L. Feeman, John G. Given & Heather D. Rafter, Streaming into the
Future: Music and Video Online, 20 Lqy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 285, 289 (2000).
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With such a combination of factors, namely, the ability to drastically reduce the
size of the computer music file, faster computer modems, good sound quality similar to
that of a compact disc, quicker transmission time, as well as the inherent non-proprietary
nature of the new technology, the development of the MP3 technology has caused the
music industry to react with alarm, citing mass piracy^^^ by users and copyright
infiingement. The understandable concern is that music which can be fi-eely and easily
accessed over the internet by millions of users, for permanent retention without the
payment of royalties, infringes the legal and economic rights of the owners of the music,
and poses a crippling effect on the legitimate music industry. The fact that it is estimated
that there are approximately 200,000 illegal MP3 websites on the intemet^^^ does little to
assuage the reasonable concerns of those who have invested significant sums to create a
legitimate industry.
Significant economic investments do not only guarantee a greater share of the
financial rewards to be gained from the music industry, they are also interrelated with
established legal rights. The RIAA contends that the widespread availability of the MPS
technology is impinging upon both the economic and legal rights of the music industry
copyright owners. In order to appreciate the argument, it is usefiil to review the
legislative framework upon which copyright holders in the music industry rely to protect
their economic interests.
"^ Needham, supra note 86, at 1 144.
'"'Mat 1146.
CHAPTER n
THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
The MP3 technology has not only made an impact on the economic interests of the
major players in the music industry. Owners of music rights argue that another critical
effect has been the diminution of legal rights. The established recording industry holds
fast to the opinion that widespread use of the new technologies is threatening long
established rights bestowed upon copyright holders by copyright law.
In the U.S., the source of copyright principles is contained in the copyright clause
of the Constitution,'^ which authorizes Congress to enact legislation granting a monopoly
for limited times to authors with respect to their 'Svritings." It seems therefore, that an
understanding of the copyright clause is a vital starting point in order to gain an overall
perspective of the theoretical basis and policy motivations behind U.S. copyright law.
Divergent interpretations appear to have arisen as to the intent and purpose of the
copyright clause, and it is argued that these diflFering views shape the development of the
law and the judicial approach to copyright issues.
Justice Stevens, in the Supreme Court decision of Sony Corporation of America
V. Universal City Studios, Inc.,'°^ interpreted the Constitution's copyright clause and
'**
"The Congress shall have Power ... To Promote the Progress of Science .... by securing for limited
Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings.." U.S. CONST, art. I. § 8, cl. 8. See
also, Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users In Copyright, 45 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 1, 4 (1997).
'"^ 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
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identified a public purpose to be served by the grant of copyright privileges to the creator
of a work. Justice Stevens observed that:
the monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor
primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is
a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the
limited period of exclusive control has expired.
According to Justice Stevens' interpretation, it appears that the limited copyright
monopoly granted by the copyright clause serves a dual public purpose: (1) it is designed
to stimulate the creative activities of authors by giving them a reward for creating, namely
a limited monopoly over the tangible results of their creative endeavors, and (2) it
facilitates public access to the author's creative activities after the limited period of
monopoly has expired.
Many commentators recognize the public purpose to be served by the grant of
copyright, however, there are divergent opinions as to who are the principal beneficiaries
of the copyright scheme. Some commentators tend to give equal weight to the benefits to
be shared by all the stakeholders, while others emphasize the rights of one category of
stakeholders over another. For example, it has been said that:
copyright is supposed to fiirther the public interest. The "public interest"
comprises the goals and aspirations of authors and users, of publishers and
educators...'^
106 Ginsburg, supra note 104, at 4.
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Other commentators emphasize that the primary beneficiary of the copyright scheme is the
user ofthe copyrighted work, the public. It has been stated that:
the [copyright] clause itself reveals the theory of copyright embodied in the
Constitution: an exclusive right, for a limited period of time, of authors to
reproduce their writings for sale in order to promote learning. The protection
Congress was empowered to grant for economic gain was to be given in return for
the author's making the work available to the public. The public purpose of
copyright, consumer access to the work, was to be implemented by its private
flinction, rewarding the author for his efforts. ^^^
This view expresses the notion that copyright is a tool designed primarily to serve the
wider public interest, namely, access to copyrighted material in order to promote the
Constitutional goal of the "progress of science." However, as a necessary adjunct to the
achievement of that goal, there must be the institution of a reward system to protect the
limited private interest of the author.
This interpretation of the theoretical basis for copyright finds support in another
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. '°* Proponents of this view acknowledge the rights
granted to authors by the copyright scheme, but they emphasize the statutory exceptions
and limitations placed on those rights.
Finally, some commentators are ofthe view that the purpose served by copyright is
to stimulate "the enterprise of authorship".**^ Proponents of this view recognize that a
'°^ L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1,11 (1987).
'"* Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) "the
primary objective ofcopyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but to 'promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.' To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a w^ork."- Jiostice O'Connor.
'^ Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L.J. 965, 969-70 (1990).
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growing trend in the U.S. is to emphasize that the legal rights created by the copyright
scheme are akin to property rights. ^^° These proponents shift their focus from the wider
public interest, to the narrower private interest of the author and his exclusive right to
control the use of his work,^^^ These advocates seek to expand the author's monopoly
over his work, while minimizing the importance of restrictions on that monopoly. They
argue that authors deserve property rights in their creative works because the cost of
producing such works is high, while the cost of unauthorized reproduction is low. The
resuhing effect is that unauthorized reproduction could lead to a reduction in the value of
the original. They further contend that unless unauthorized reproduction is restricted, the
author would not be able to recoup the costs of creation and would have no further
incentive to create.*'^ An extension to this argument is that there could be no benefit to
the public interest unless the author is provided with an incentive to create. Without such
incentives, there would be a dearth of creative works to the detriment ofthe public.
While the purpose of this Thesis is not to express an opinion on which side of the
debate is correct or to resolve the debate, it is suggested that the answer to these
theoretical issues lies in the words of the constitutional provision which serves as the
source of U.S. copyright principles. It is submitted that the clear meaning ofthe copyright
clause articulates that the framers of the early Constitution had two objectives in mind
when drafting the copyright clause, but these objectives do not enjoy equal importance.
"°/(i. at970.
'"/c^. at 970.
'2/^. at 970-71.
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Firstly, the framers were inspired by the noble intent to promote an objective that
would impact on the widest possible audience, the public. This primary objective is the
"promotion of the progress of science." Secondly, the framers recognized that in order to
achieve the first objective, there must be a limited economic benefit bestowed on the
copyright owner. This secondary objective was of lesser significance because it was
designed to facilitate the principal objective, namely, the public purpose objective, and the
economic monopoly that was granted to the author was secured for a finite duration, that
is, "limited times."
These divergent views with respect to the exact meaning of the constitutional
purpose of copyright, has understandably led to some tension between copyrights holders
who wish to rely on their "property" rights to safeguard their legal and economic interests,
and users who wish to rely on the "public benefit" concept of copyright to ensure
unrestricted access to copyrighted materials. This tension is not relieved by the
inconsistent approach adopted by some courts in addressing infiingement of copyright
issues, and a brief overview of the copyright statute may be of assistance before select
judicial decisions are analyzed.
Copyright protection in the U.S. subsists in a wide array of original works of
authorship ranging from literary works to architectural works, and embraces musical
works (including accompanying words), sound recordings,'*^ compilations and derivative
113 17 U. S. C. § 102 (1994).
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works. '^'^ However, it does not extend to ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods
of operation, concepts, principles or discoveries.^'^
In order for a prescribed work to be subject to copyright protection, two
requirements must be met. Firstly, the work must be original, and secondly, the work
must be fixed. The current statute provides that copyright protection subsists in "original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."'*^ The terms
"authorship" and "original", while not defined in the statute, have received judicial
interpretation. The term "author" has been defined as "he to whom, anything owes its
origin,""^ while it has been said that the originality requirement does not equate with
novelty, but means that the copyrighted work must "owe its origin to the author."''* The
U.S. Supreme Court has said that the ""sine qua non of copyright is originality""^ and that
"originality is a constitutional requirement."'^^ The courts have also established another
necessary element to the originality requirement, that is, a minimal degree of creativity
must be added by the author.'^'
The fixation requirement has been defined in the U.S. Copyright Statute'^ (the
U.S. Statute), and is satisfied when the work is expressed in a tangible medium by or
""Mat §103.
"^M at § 102 (b).
"* Mat §102 (a).
"^ Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 1 1 1 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
"* Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-3 (2d Cir. 1951).
"' Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, hic. 499 U.S. 340, 345, 348 (1991).
'2° Id. at 346.
'2' Id. at 346.
'^^ 17 U. S. C. § 101 (1994).
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under the authority of the author, and is sufiBciently stable to be perceived, reproduced or
communicated for more than transitory duration.
The two main categories of copyrighted works implicated in the Napster litigation
are musical works and sound recordings. Musical works have not been defined in the U.S.
Statute, but they are generally said to include both the instrumental element of the work
(the melody) and the accompanying words (the lyrics). ^^ Sound recordings have been
defined as "works that result fi"om the fixation of a series of musical, spoken or other
sounds." ^^"^ The tangible medium in which the sounds are fixed is unimportant, but the
copyright protection granted to authors of sound recordings does not extend to the sounds
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work,^^^ as these sounds are already
subject to copyright protection when forming part of a motion picture or other audio
visual work. '^^
Both musical works and sound recordings can be fixed in the same physical object,
such as a disk or cassette, but they remain two distinct works for copyright purposes. As
previously mentioned, the musical work comprises the melody and the lyrics, while the
sound recording comprises, among other things, the rendition of the song. The sound
'^ Craig Joyce, William Patry, Marshall Leaffer & Peter Jaszi, Copyright Law, 177 (5th ed. Lexis
Publishing 2000).
^^''nu. S.C. §101 (1994).
'"/(/. at § 101.
126Mat§ 101.
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recording also covers the manner in which the song is: (1) sung by the vocalist, (2) played
by the musicians, and (3) arranged and mixed by the sound engineer/^^
Although musical works and sound recordings remain distinct for copyright
purposes, in reality the lines between the two types of works can become blurred when
issues of ownership of the respective works arise. Intricate contractual arrangements
abound, and the exercise of rights in one of the works usually requires the exercise of
exclusive rights in the other.
'^^
Generally, the copyright in the musical work is owned by its "author" the
composer, or by the music publisher (the latter can be an affiliate company of the
"author's" record company) if the composer assigns his copyright. On the other hand, the
record company usually owns the copyright in the sound recording. '^^ Contractual
arrangements between the composer/artist, his music publisher and record label determine
who will ultimately own the copyright in any of these works. In the context of the sound
recording, a contractual arrangement is a practical necessity to settle ownership issues as
contributions are invariably made by diverse persons to the creation of the work, all of
whom can be considered its creators.'^"
*^' Jcfyce, supra note 123, at 207.
'^* Jeffrey D. Neuburger & Susan Israel, Music Industry Acts in Concert on Sound Samples-Harmonious
Compromise could Resolve Licensing Issues Arising From the Downloading ofMusic, 1/26/98 NU C 1 7,
(col. 1).
'2' See id. at 2.
'^° Joyce, supra note 123, at 208.
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The U.S. Statute grants to the author of the work (in this Thesis, the term "author"
is being used to signify either the creator of the work or the "author" by assignment) six
exclusive rights. ^^^ These exclusive rights are made subject to and limited by 15 other
provisions of the Act/^^ including the statutory Fair Use provision. *^^ The author has the
exclusive right to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) the right to reproduce the
work, (2) the right to prepare derivative works, (3) the right to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the work, (4) the right of public performance in specified works,
including musical works, (5) the right to publicly display certain specified works, and (6)
in the case of sound recordings, the right to publicly perform the work by means of a
digital audio transmission.
In the context of the digital distribution of music, the main legal rights that are
implicated for copyright owners are the reproduction and distribution rights, and
specifically in the case of sound recordings, the public performance of the work by means
of a digital audio transmission. The reproduction right gives the author control over the
making of copies of the work, including any permanent or temporary copy of the work or
sound recording created in electronic form.
These exclusive rights offer the author two valuable attributes of copyright: first,
the ability to forbid others fi-om infiinging on his statutory rights, and secondly, the
"* 17 U. S. C. § 106 (1994).
"^/rf. at§§ 107-121.
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/fif. at§107.
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freedom to exploit his work by granting licenses to others'^ for a fee. These exclusive
rights can be transferred as a bundle or individually by means of conveyance or by
operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will.^^^ Although the inherent nature of
copyright envisions the right of the author to set his own licensing fees, there are instances
where a third party can use a copyrighted work without the copyright owner's permission,
provided that he complies with the statutory procedure and pays set royalties to the
copyright owner/^^
The exclusive rights granted by the U.S. Statute are not absolute. They are limited
both in duration and in scope. As a general proposition, the term of copyright subsists for
the life of the author plus 70 years after his death. ^"'^ This term is subject to variation
depending upon whether the work is anonymous, pseudonymous or made for hire,*^^ or
whether and when it was published. ^^^ In addition, as already mentioned, there are 15
statutory limitations and exemptions to copyright which limit the scope of the author's
monopoly over his work. One such statutory limitation on copyright's scope is the
doctrine of Fair Use.
^^ Russell Frame, The Protection and Exploitation ofIntellectual Property Rights on the Internet: The
Way Forward For The Music Industry, I.P.Q. 1999, 4, 443-470, 449.
"^ 17 U. S. C. § 201 (d) (1) (1994).
'^* Joyce, supra note 123, at 493.
'^'17U. S. C. §302(a).
"* Id at § 302 (b).
"' Id at § 303 - 4.
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The Fair Use doctrine was initially created by the courts as a defense to a claim of
copyright infringement by the copyright owner^'"^ and has since been codified in the U.S.
Statute.
^'*^ The statutory provision sets out a non-exhaustive list of circumstances in
which the unauthorized use of a copyrighted work would not be considered copyright
infringement. These circumstances include the fair use of a work by reproduction for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship or research.
Further, the statutory provision sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors to be
considered by the court to determine whether the unauthorized use of a copyrighted work
is fair. These factors include: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature
of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.^'*'^ The treatment of the Fair Use doctrine by
the District Court and the Ninth circuit in the Napster litigation will be more fully
developed in Chapter III of this Thesis.
Copyright legislation was first introduced to Trinidad and Tobago during the
former period of British colonial rule. The United Kingdom's Copyright Act of 1911
^^ Folsom V. Marsh 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (1841) where the Plaintiffalleged copyright infringement of his
twelve volume work on the writings ofGeorge Washington. Justice Story said that in a case of copyright
infringement, the court must "look to the nature and objects ofthe selections made, the quantity and value
ofthe materials used, and the degree in v^ch the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, ofthe original work."
"" 17U. S. C. § 107.
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provided in section 25 that it would extend "throughout his Majesty's dominions."''*^
Since those early days, several pieces of copyright legislation have been enacted ia
Trinidad and Tobago over the years leading to the current Copyright Act (the T. & T.
Act).^^
The T. & T. Act leaves no room for debate as to the purpose served by copyright,
as occurs in the U.S. The T. & T. Act specifically provides that copyright is a property
right. '"'^ The provisions of the T. & T. Act closely follow the norms set out in international
treaties and conventions such as the Berne Convention, ^"^^ to which Trinidad and Tobago
became a party on August 16, 1988.'''^ However, there is at least one provision which
renders the T. & T. Act particularly relevant to the national situation. For example,
copyright protection as a derivative work,^"** is granted to works of mas,'"*^ an integral
feature of the Trinidad and Tobago carnival.
The T. & T. Act provides that copyright subsists in a wide array of literary and
artistic works including musical works, with or without accompanying words. ^^^ Unlike
*^^ AllisOTi Demas, Development & Current Status ofCopyright & Neighbouring Rights Protection in
Trinidad and Tobago, 1 (1998). Paper presented diuing Copyright Week in Trinidad and Tobago and
organized by the Ministry of Legal Afifairs of Trinidad and Tobago in collaboration with the World
Intellectual Property Organization (Jan. 25-29, 1998).
''" The Copyright Act of Trinidad and Tobago 1997, available at
www.sice.oas.ca-g/int_prop/nat_leg/Trinidad/L8_i.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2001).
'*^
Id. at section 5.
'"^ Berne Cooventicm for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, available at
http://www.wipo.org/treaties/ip/beme/beme01.html (last visited May 9, 2(X)1).
'""^ http://www.wipo.org/treaties/docs/english/e-beme.doc (last visited May 9, 2001).
'"^ Supra, note 144, at section 6 (1) (c).
'^' Id. at section 3. See also Demas, supra note 143, at 3.
'^Vc?. at section 5(1) (e).
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the U.S. position, sound recordings are not protected by copyright, but are protected as
"neighbouring rights." The T. & T. Act does not define literary or artistic works, however
examples of such works are contained in the Berne Convention. ^^' They include books,
pamphlets and other writings, lectures, addresses, sermons, dramatic works, musical
compositions with or without words, and various other types of works. All these works,
including musical works, with or without accompanying words, are protected by copyright
undertheT. &T. Act.^^2
Unlike the U.S. situation which requires originality and fixation before copyright
can subsist, in Trinidad and Tobago, the sole requirement for copyright protection is that
the work must be original. '^^ There is no fixation requirement, and the prescribed works
are protected:
by the sole fact of their creation and irrespective of their mode or form of
expression, as well as of their content, quality and purpose. '^''
Similar to the U.S. position, originality denotes that the work must owe its origin to the
author, and is not synonymous with novelty. The T. & T. Act specifies that an "author"
means a "natural person who has created the work."'"
'^' Supra, note 146, at Article 2(1).
'" Supra, note 144, at section 5(1).
153
Id. at section 5 (1).
'^ Id. at section 5 (2).
*" Id. at section 3.
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In the case of University of London Press, Limited v. University Tutorial
Press, Limited, ^^^ the issues to be determined were whether examination papers prepared
by examiners for the University of London, were subject to copyright as "original literary
works" within the meaning of the Copyright Act 1911, and if they were so subject, who
owned the copyright. The court first held that the papers were literary works within the
meaning of the relevant act.*^^ With respect to the originality issue, Justice Peterson noted
that:
the word "original" does not in this connection mean that the work must be the
expression of original or inventive thought...The originality which is required
relates to the expression of the thought. But the Act does not require that the
expression must be in an original or novel form, but that the work must not be
copied fi'om another work - that it should originate fi"om the author. ^^*
Ultimately, the court held that the copyright was vested in the examiners, subject to the
obligation contained in the examiner's contract of employment to assign it to the
University.
^^^
The T. & T. Act excludes fi"om copyright protection ideas, procedures, systems,
methods of operation, concepts, principles, discoveries or mere data, any oflBcial text of a
legislative, administrative or legal nature, political speeches and speeches delivered in the
course of legal proceedings.^^ In works in which copyright subsists, the copyright holder
has the exclusive right to do, authorize or prohibit the following acts: (1) the reproduction
'^<*[1916]2Ch. 601.
'" Id. at 608.
'^*/c/. at 608-9.
'^' Mat 612.
^^ Supra, note 144, at section 7(1).
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of the work; (2) the translation of the work; (3) the adaptation, arrangement or
transformation of the work; (4) the first public distribution of the work; (5) the rental or
public lending of certain prescribed works, including a work embodied in a sound
recording; (6) the importation of copies of the work; (7) the public display of the work;
(8) the public performance of the work; (9) the broadcasting of the work; and (10) the
communication to the public ofthe work.^^^
In the context of the digital distribution of music, under the T. & T. Act, two of
the primary rights implicated with respect to musical works are the reproduction right and
the right to communicate the work to the public. The reproduction right gives the author
control over the making of copies of the work, including any permanent or temporary
storage of the work in electronic form. '^^ The right to communicate the work to the
public is the right to control the transmission of images of sounds of the work by wire or
wireless means to persons outside the normal circle of a family and its closest social
acquaintances.'^^
Unlike the U.S. position, the T. & T. Act ililly recognizes and grants to the author
of all categories of works, moral rights with respect to his work.'^ In the U.S., the moral
rights of attribution and integrity are independent of the copyright, but they are only
'*' Id. at section 8 (1).
'" Id. at section 3.
'" Id. at section 3.
*"/£/. at section 18.
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granted to an author of a work of visual art. The moral rights in the Trinidad and
Tobago context are independent of the copyright and subsist even though the author may
no longer own the copyright.
^^
The moral rights entitle the author to: (1) have his name indicated prominently on
the copies and in connection with the public use of his work, (2) not have his name
indicated on copies and in connection vdth any public use of his work, (3) use a
pseudonym, and (4) object to any distortion, mutilation, modification or derogatory action
in relation to his work which would prejudice his reputation and honour, ^^^
Similar to the U.S. position, the exclusive rights granted by copyright under the
T. & T. Act are not absolute. The copyright is limited in duration and scope and is subject
to several statutory exemptions and limitations. ^^^ As a general proposition, copyright and
moral rights subsist for the life of the author plus fifty years after his death. '^^ This term is
subject to modification depending upon whether the work is a collective work or audio
visual work,^^^ or an anonymous or pseudonymous work.'^^
One of the primary limitations on the scope of copyright under the T. & T. Act, is
the privilege granted to a natural person, exclusively for his own personal purposes, to
engage in the private reproduction of a published work in a single copy without the
'^^ 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
'^ Supra, note 144, at section 18 (1).
'^^ Id. at section 18 (1) (a) (b) (c) (d).
'^^/t^. at sections 9 -17.
'^Vfi?. at section 19(1).
'^"K at section 19 (3).
'^*M at section 19(4).
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authorization of the copyright owner. *^^ It should be noted that the T. & T. Act does not
contain a definition of the term "personal purposes," although a definition is provided for
the phrase "communication to the public."^^^ As previously mentioned, this latter phrase
signifies that the communication is made to persons outside the normal circle of a family
and its closest social acquaintances.
In light of this definition, it can reasonably be assumed that reproduction for
"personal purposes" would occur in a situation in which the end-user makes a single
reproduced copy for his private use, whether or not he is in the company of his intimate
circle of family and close fiiends. It should be noted that the permission granted for the
unauthorized reproduction for "personal purposes" is itself qualified. The privilege does
not apply in circumstances where the reproduction of the work for "personal purposes"
would conflict with the normal exploitation of the work, or would unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the copyright owner. ^^'* This provision closely follows the
norms set out in the Berne Convention. ^^^ The effect of this limitation on the copyright
and its relevance to the Napster litigation will be more fiilly discussed in Chapter III of this
Thesis.
As was alluded to earlier in this Chapter, sound recordings are not protected by
copyright in the Trinidad and Tobago legislation. While the T. & T. Act does not define
'^^ Mat section 9(1).
'"Mat section 3.
^'"^
Id. at section 9 (2).
'^^ Berne Convention for the Protection ofLiterary and Artistic Works, Article 9 (2), available at
http://www.wipo.org/treaties/ip/beme/beme01.html (last visited May 9, 2001).
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"musical works," a definition is provided for sound recordings, which generally refers to
the aural fixation of sounds, excluding the fixed sounds of an audiovisual work.^^^ Sound
recordings are protected in the legislation as "neighbouring rights."*^
Neighbouring rights are also property rights,*'* but the scope of protection is not
as broad as the protection afforded by copyright. The owner of the neighbouring rights in
a sound recording is known as the producer.*'^ The producer is the natural person or
legal entity by whom the necessary arrangements for making the sound recording are
undertaken, **° It is suggested that the producer is analogous to the record company in the
U.S. context.
The neighbouring rights grant the producer the exclusive right to do, authorize or
prohibit any of the following: (1) the direct or indirect reproduction of the sound
recording, (2) the importation of copies of the sound recording, (3) the first public
distribution of the sound recording, (4) the adaptation or other transformation of the
sound recording, (5) the rental of the sound recording, and (6) the making available to the
public of the sound recording through an electronic retrieval system.**' An electronic
retrieval system is defined in the T. & T. Act as an electronic system in which the works
'^* The Copyright Act ofTrinidad and Tobago 1997, available at
www.sice.oas.org/int_prop/nat_leg/Trinidad/L8_i.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2001) - id. at section 3 "sound
recording" 'is any exclusively aural fixation ofthe sounds of a performance or of other sounds, regardless
of the method by which the sounds are fixed or the medium in which the soimds are embodied but does
not include a fixation of sounds and images, such as the sound track ofan audiovisual work.'
'"M at section 20.
'^^
Id. at section 20.
"'Mat section 22(1).
^^ Id. at section 3.
'^' Id. at section 22 (1).
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may be stored, and from which a member ofthe public may cause a work to be selected by
him to be transmitted by wire or wireless means to receiving equipment under his
control.'*^
With respect to the digital distribution of music, two of the primary neighbouring
rights which are implicated are the reproduction right and the right to make the sound
recording available to the public through an electronic retrieval system. However, the
statutory definition of "electronic retrieval system" raises the interesting issue as to
whether the Napster technology fells within the definition. As will be discussed in Chapter
III, the Napster servers facilitate the peer-to-peer sharing of MP3 music files. While the
user makes the choice as to which file he wishes to download from another user's online
music library, it is the Napster server which allows the sharing ofmusic files between users
to occur. In addition, the MP3 files are not "stored" on the Napster servers. The issue
then is whether the Napster servers could reasonably be considered an "electronic retrieval
system" under the T. & T. Act.
It can be argued that the use of the discretionary term "may" in the definition, is
suflBciently imprecise to include the Napster technology. The statutory definition
implicitly presents two possibilities in order to qualify as an "electronic retrieval system".
One possibility is that the works are stored in the electronic system, while the alternative
situation is one in which the works are not stored in the electronic system. Although in
'*^A/. at section 3.
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either one of the alternative possibilities, a member of the public should be able to cause a
work selected by him, to be transmitted to him by wire or wireless means to receiving
equipment under his control. In the case of the digital downloading of music, a computer
connected to the internet would qualify as such receiving equipment. In light of these two
alternative possibilities presented by the statutory definition of electronic retrieval system,
it is at least arguable that the Napster technology would be captured by the statutory
definition.
Similar to the copyright in a protected work, the neighbouring rights are also
limited in duration and scope by statutory provisions. Neighbouring rights subsist for a
shorter term than copyright, and are protected for a fifty year period and no more, which
is calculated either fi-om the date of publication, or if the work is unpublished, fi"om the
date of fixation of the sound recording.^^^ There is no privilege for the continuation of the
neighbouring rights after the death of the producer as occurs with the copyright owners'
privilege in musical works. In addition, the owner of neighbouring rights does not have
the benefit of independent moral rights in his work, as does the owner of copyright.
However, both copyright and neighbouring rights are transmissible by assignment as a
bundle of rights, or individually, and can be disposed ofby operation of law, as personal or
moveable property.'**
'^^
Id. at section 22 (2).
'*^ A/, at section 28(1).
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There are several limitations on the producer's neighbouring rights. For the
purpose of this Thesis, the principal limitation is the privilege granted for the unauthorized
use of a sound recording by a natural person exclusively for his own personal purposes. ^^^
As already mentioned, a similar provision limits the copyright holder's reproduction right.
The effect of this statutory limitation contained in the Trinidad and Tobago legislation, as
well as the doctrine of fair use which is a limitation on copyright in the U.S. copyright
legislation, will be discussed in Chapter III of this Thesis.
Both the legislation of the U.S. and Trinidad and Tobago impose penalties on a
copyright infringer. Penalties for the infringement of neighbouring rights are also provided
for in the Trinidad and Tobago legislation. In the U.S., a copyright owner has several civil
remedies available to him for copyright infringement, although some of these remedies can
only be relied upon if the copyrighted work was registered. '^^ Civil remedies include
injunctions to restrain copyright infringement,**^ the impounding and disposition of
infringing articles,*** the imposition of statutory damages and the repayment of profits
earned by the infringer,**^ and the imposition of costs and attorney's fees.*^
The copyright infiinger in the U.S. can also be subject to criminal sanctions. These
sanctions include the forfeiture and destruction of infringing copies and implements used
'*^ Id. at section 25 (a).
*** Rosemarie F. Jones, Comment, Wet Footprints? Digital Watermarks: A Trail To the Copyright
Infringer on the Internet, 23 Pepp. L. Rev. 559, 563 (1999).
'*^ 17U.S.C. §502.
'** Id. at § 503.
'*Vfif. at § 504.
""Mat §505.
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to manufecture the copies, ^^^ the imposition of a fine of not more than $2,500.00 for
placing a fi-audulent copyright notice on an article,^^ for the fi-audulent removal of a
copyright notice, ^^^ and for knowingly making a false representation in the application for
copyright registration.^^"*
In the Trinidad and Tobago legislation, civil and criminal remedies can also be
imposed on an infringer of copyright and/or neighbouring rights. Civil remedies include
the grant of an injunction, ^^^ the impounding of unauthorized copies of the work or sound
recordings, ^^ the forfeiture and seizure of the unauthorized copies,*^ the payment of
compensatory damages and expenses, including legal costs, to the owner of the protected
right,^^* the accounting of the infiinger's profits, ^^ and the destruction ofthe unauthorized
copies.^^
Criminal sanctions include the imposition of a fine of TT$ 100,000.00 on summary
conviction and imprisonment for 1 years.^^' This penalty can be increased up to double
where the infringer has been convicted for a new act of infringement within five years of a
''' Id. at § 506 (2) (b).
'^ Id. at § 506 (2) (c).
''^ Id. at § 506 (2) (d).
^^ Id. at § 506 (2) (e).
''^ The Copyright Act ofTrinidad and Tobago 1997, available at
www.sice.oas.cffg/int_prop/nat_leg/Trinidad/L8_i.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2001) - See
id. at section 38 (1) (a).
'''^ Mat Section 38 (l)(b).
^'' Mat Section 38 (l)(c).
''* Mat Section 38 (l)(d).
''^ Mat Section 38 (l)(f).
^°° Mat Section 38 (l)(g).
2°' Mat Section 41(1).
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previous conviction for an infringement.^^ Other criminal sanctions include the
impounding of the infringing work, the forfeiture and seizure of the unauthorized copies
and the destruction of the infringing work, provided that no decision has been taken on
these remedies in civil proceedings.^^^
Under the U.S. legislation, the formidable array of statutory remedies provided to
punish copyright infringement, is irrelevant to a defendant who is protected by the fair use
doctrine. As was noted by Justice Stevens in the Sony decision:
anyone who is authorized by the copyright owner to use the copyrighted work in a
way specified in the statute or who makes a fair use of the work is not an infringer
of the copyright with respect to such use.^^
As will be illustrated in Chapter III of this Thesis, the doctrine of fair use is meant to be a
fluid, equitable rule of reason, applied on a case-by-case basis. The doctrine was raised as
a defense and rejected by the court in the Napster litigation, and both the District Court
and Ninth Circuit's treatment of the doctrine forms the basis of the discussion in the
following Chapter.
^'^/fi?. at Section 41 (3)
2°V^. at Section 41 (4)
204 Sony Corporation ofAmerica v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984).
CHAPTERm
FAIR USE - A&M RECORDS, INC. v. NAPSTER, INC.
The Napster technology was developed in early 1999 by a nineteen-year old
college freshman computer science student, Shawn Fanning, Fanning was interested in
making it easier for his roommate to locate MP3 music files on the internet instead of
using conventional search engines.^*^^ His idea was to allow internet users to share MP3
files stored on their computer hard drives, directly with one another with the aid of a
centralized database of titles, combined with software that converted each user's computer
into a server.^^ By May, 1 999 the company Napster, Inc. was incorporated.^^^
Fanning developed the MusicShare software to convert his idea into reality. The
software, when downloaded onto a user's computer, allows the user to connect to a
database when surfing the Napster website and identify which MP3 files he is willing to
share (or not share) with other internet users. The titles of the user's MP3 music filles,
along with the Internet Protocol address of the "sharing" or "host" user, are stored in
Napster's database, but the actual MP3 music files are not stored on Napster's servers.^^*
^'^^ Ariel Berschadsky, RL4A v. Napster: A Window Onto the Future ofCopyright Law in the Internet Age,
18 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 755, 759 (2000). See also Spencer E. Ante, Steven V. Brull,
Dennis K. Berman & Mike France, Inside Napster, Business Week, August 14, 2000 available at Lexis-
Nexis. - Shawn Fanning was a computer science student at Northeastern University in Boston, before he
dropped out in January, 1999 to work on the Napster system flilhime.
^*^ Berschadsky, supra note 205, at 759.
^""^ See Ante, supra note 205.
^°* Berschadsky, supra note 205, at 760.
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One advantage of the Napster technology over other search engines is that it
specializes in MP3 files, and since it possesses a continually updated database of file
names, it is almost guaranteed that a user wishing to source a specific music file will be
able to obtain it if it is listed in the Napster database.^"^
Any "searching" user who has downloaded the MusicShare software can connect
to Napster's central database and search for the specific title of a song. The search will
reveal, among other things, whether there are any other users with that specific song title
on their computer hard drive. The searching user specifies which host user he wishes to
obtain the song from by downloading it onto his computer. The Napster servers then let
the identified host user know that another user is seeking to download a song from his
files. The host user's computer then begins to act as a server and the designated MP3
music files can be transmitted from the host user directly to the "searching" user with the
assistance of each user's Internet Service Provider.^'"
Prior to the actual downloading of the music file from the identified host user, the
Napster servers obtain the IP address information of the host. The servers then transmit
this information to the searching user. The searching user's computer utilizes this
information to connect with the host user's browser software and can then begin the
actual downloading process from the host user's MP3 music file library.^' ^ During the
2<^Mat761.
2'" Id. at 760.
^" A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 1 14 F. Supp. 2d 896, 906-7 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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actual transfer process, the Napster servers are not being utilized.^^^ A noteworthy feature
of the technology is that the content of the MP3 music file is transferred over the internet
between users and not through the Napster servers. The MusicShare software also
includes a browser interface, search engine and chat fimctions which operate along with
Napster's online network of servers.^^^
The MusicShare software is available at no cost fi-om the Napster website, and
from its inception the technology became an instant hit, especially on U.S. college
campuses. Widespread use of MP3 music file sharing fecilitated by the Napster
technology, and the extensive amount of internet resources involved, led to the banning of
all Napster use on almost 200 college campuses in the U.S.^^"* At Oregon State
University, Napster use was taking up 10% of the school's internet bandwidth by October,
1999.^'^ At Florida State University, Napster use was utilizing 20% to 30% of the
school's bandwidth.^'^ At the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, it was said at
one point that Napster use was employing 75% to 80% of the university's bandwidth.^'^
According to Napster, Inc.'s projections, by the end of2000 there would have been
^'^ Berschadsky, supra note 205, at 760.
2" Napster, 1 14 F. Supp. 2d at 905.
214 Ann Donohue, Napster, Variety (March 20, 2000), available at
http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/ml312/5_378/61352044/pl/article.jhtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2000).
^'^ Spencer E. Ante, Steven V. Brull, Dennis K. Berman & Mike France, Inside Napster, Business Week,
August 14, 2000 available at Lexis-Nexis.
^'* Spencer E. Ante, Steven V. Brull, Dennis K. Berman & Mike France, Inside Napster, Business Week,
August 14, 2000 available at Lexis-Nexis.
^" Spencer E. Ante, Steven V. Brull, Dennis K. Berman & Mike France, Inside Napster, Business Week,
Ai^ust 14, 2000 available at Lexis-Nexis.
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approximately 75 million Napster users?^^ In addition, statistics reveal that on average,
10,000 music files are shared per second using Napster, and every second, more than 100
users try to log on to the system.^^^
By November 1999, a Napster user could theoretically obtain fi-om 60,000 to
100,000 MP3 music files, at no cost, depending on the number of other users connected to
the internet at the same time.^° By April 2000, there were over 5 million registered
Napster users, and by June 2000, the approximate number of available MP3 files that
could be obtained had grown to about 600,000.^^ With such a large base of users
increasing at an accelerated rate, it was to be anticipated that the owners of legal rights in
the music files and sound recordings, would view the new Napster technology with
apprehension and hostility. These fears were exacerbated by the fact that the growing
base of users was able to easily and quickly obtain copyrighted, good quality MP3 music
files fi"ee of charge.
On December 6, 1 999, 1 8 record company plaintiffs comprising the Big Five and
other record companies, many ofwhom are affiliates ofthe Big Five,"^^ initiated a lawsuit
2'^ Napster, 1 14 F. Supp. 2d at 902.
2'* Id. at 902.
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Ariel Berschadsky, RIAA v. Napster: A Window onto the Fidiire ofCopyright Law in the Internet Age,
1 8 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 755, 761 (2000).
'^'K at 761.
^^^ Napster, 1 14 F. Supp. 2d at 908-909- "BMG's labels include plaintifis Arista Records, LaFace Records
and RCA Records.... Plaintifis Capitol Records, Inc. and Virgin Records America are affiliated with EMI
Recorded Music, North America (EMI).... Plaintifis A & M Records, Gefien Records, Interscope Records,
Island Records, MCA Records, Motown Records, UMG Records and Universal Records [are] collectively
Universal....Warner Music Group and its associated labels [are] plaintifis Atlantic Recording Corp.,
Londcai-Sire Reccffds Inc., Electra Entertainment Group Inc., and Warner Bros. Records."
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against Napster, Inc., alleging among other things, contributory and vicarious copyright
infringement. On January 7, 2000, various music publisher plaintiffs filed a similar
complaint against the internet company,^^ The record company plaintiffs and the music
publisher plaintiffs were seeking to have Napster, Inc. preliminarily enjoined from:
engaging in or assisting others in copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting,
or distributing copyrighted music without the express permission of the rights
224
owner.
The District Court Judge, Judge Patel, found as a feet that the majority of the music
available on the Napster website was copyrighted, with about 87% of the files sampled by
the plaintiffs' expert witness, "belong[ing] to or are administered by plaintiffs or other
copyright holders."^^
Napster, Inc. relied on several defenses in answer to the plaintiffs' motion,
including the "feir use" doctrine, as well as the argument that there was a substantial non-
infringing use of the Napster service.^^^ This Thesis will focus on the court's treatment of
the fair use doctrine. Judge Patel rejected the defendant's argument that it was protected
by the feir use doctrine, and proceeded to consider the doctrine against the backdrop of
the four fectors listed in the statutory fair use provision,^^ as well as selected judicial
authorities.
22^ Id. at 900.
^* Id. at 900.
^" Id. at 903.
22*/^. at 912.
2" Mat 912
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It is suggested that while the learned judge's analysis of the second and third
statutory fair use factors is consistent with judicial authority, the analysis of the &st and
fourth statutory fair use factors is subject to question for three principal reasons. First, it
is argued that the analysis of the first and fourth statutory factors fails to give due
consideration to the specific context in which the dispute arises, namely the internet, in its
application of legal principles. Established dicta provides that the application of the
statutory factors must be guided by the specific fact situation facing the court, and this
Thesis contends that suflHcient weight was not given to the specific fects before the court.
Secondly, it is contended that Judge Patel misapplies dicta fi-om established cases
in her analysis of the first and fourth statutory fair use factors. Finally, it is suggested that
the learned judge's reliance on the authority of UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com,
Inc,^* was misplaced, as that judicial decision expounds a view of U.S. copyright law
that is arguably contrary to copyright's explicit constitutional purpose as set out in the
Constitution's copyright clause, and Supreme Court decisions interpreting the clause.
The First Fair Use Factor
^the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.''
With regard to the first statutory factor, Judge Patel found that this factor militated
against a finding of fair use.^^^ Judge Patel stated that two elements must be considered
^^^ 92 F.Supp.2d 349 (S.D. N.Y. 2000).
^'^^ Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912.
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when examining this statutory factor. The first element is whether the new work
"transforms the copyrighted material," as such transformation "satisfies the main goal of
the first factor."^^ The second critical element to be considered is whether the use of the
copyrighted material was commercial in nature.^' Judge Patel's treatment of these two
elements will be discussed in light of select judicial authorities.
(a) Campbell v. AcufT-Rose Music, Inc.
Judge Patel cited the case of Campbell v. Acufif-Rose Music, Inc.,^^ for the
proposition that the new work's transformation of the original copyrighted work, satisfies
the main goal of the first fair use factor. The learned judge then relied on the UMG
Recordings decision and ruled that the downloading of MP3 music files did not transform
the original copyrighted music.^^ The result being that without such "transformation," the
first statutory factor weighed against the proponent ofthe fair use doctrine.
In considering whether the use was commercial. Judge Patel noted that in
accordance with Campbell, while a finding of commercial use did not preclude a
determination of fair use, it weighs against it.^^ The learned judge then held that since the
Napster users obtained music for fi-ee that they would ordinarily have to pay for, this
suggested that they reaped an economic advantage fi"om Napster use.
2^V^. at912.
"'Mat 912.
"2 510 U.S. 569(1994).
"^ Napster, 1 14 F. Supp. 2d at 912.
2^ Mat 912.
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Such an economic advantage benefited the Napster subscribers to the detriment of the
copyright owners, with the result that the first statutory fair use factor weighed against a
finding of fair use.""^
The Campbell case is the Supreme Court's most recent interpretation of the Fair
Use doctrine, and the Court reviewed several earlier Supreme Court decisions on the
issue. In Campbell, the issue before the Court was whether a commercial parody of a
copyrighted song constituted a fair use of that song.^^ The judgment was rendered by a
unanimous Supreme Court. The Court first noted that:
From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of
copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fiilfill copyright's very
purpose, "to promote the Progress of Science and useftil Arts..."^^
The Court then observed that the fair use doctrine emerged as a judge-made doctrine in
the case ofFokom v. Marsh,^^ until codification in the 1976 Copyright Act.^^^ Justice
"Vfi?. at 912-13.
2^ Campbell, 510 U.S. at 571-72
"^ Id. at 575.
238 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C. D. Mass. 1841) - where Circuit Justice Stcay noted that "It is certainly not
necessary, to constitute an invasiwi of copyright, that the whole of a work should be copied, or even a
large portion of it, in fcMm or in substance. If so much is taken, that the value of the original is sensibly
diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by
another, that is sufficient, in point of law, to constitute a piracy pro tanto...we must often, in deciding
questions of this sort, lode to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the
materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work."
^^' Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576. See also 17 U.S.C. § 107 "Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106
and 106A, the fair use ofa copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infiingement of copyright. In determining whether the use made ofa work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include- (1) the purpose and character ofthe use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature ofthe
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality ofthe portion used in relation to the copyrighted
wOTk as a wiiole; and (4) the eflFect ofthe use upon the potential market for or value ofthe copyrighted
59
Souter, who delivered the opinion of the Court, emphasized that in applying the fair use
doctrine, there should be no "bright-line rules." Instead, courts should look at the
specifics of each case on a case-by-case analysis.'^'"^ Further, the four statutory factors
were not to be treated in isolation fi-om each other, but instead all should be considered
and the results weighed together, in light of copyright's constitutional purpose.^'*^
The position adopted by the Campbell Court to grant equal weight to the four
statutory fair use factors, was a reversal fi"om two earlier Supreme Court decisions.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises^'*^ and Stewart v. Abend,^'*^
which both held that the fourth statutory feir use factor was the most important of all the
fair use factors.
In considering the first factor, the Campbell court noted that this factor drew on
Justice Story's formulation in Folsom v. Marsh, "the nature and objects of the selections
made."^"*^ The Court noted that the enquiry could be guided by the examples set out in the
preamble to the feir use statutory provision, to determine whether the allegedly infiinging
use is for comment, criticism, news reporting or other such matters. The main purpose of
the enquiry is to determine whether the new work superseded or supplanted the original
wwk."
2'^ Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.
2^*'
Id. at 578.
^'•^ 471 us 539, 566 (1985).
^'•M95 US 207, 238 (1990).
2'" Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
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work, or whether and to what extent it added "something new, with a further purpose or
different character...and to what extent the new work is transformative."^'*^
However, the Court observed that a transformative use is not "absolutely
necessary" for a finding of fair use.^'*^ In other words, it is suggested that the point being
made by the Court was that a transformative use was not dispositive of the first fair use
fector. However, the Court's view was that copyright's goal ofpromoting science and the
arts, was generally furthered by the creation of transformative works, and the more
transformative the new work, the less important other factors, like commercialism, which
could weigh against a finding of fair use.^'*''
It can be argued that the Court's position was that the more the allegedly
infringing work added something "new" to the original work, the more likely a court
would rule in favor of fair use, even if the infringing work was created for a commercial
purpose. The Court seemed to be placing greater significance on the "transformative"
element of the allegedly infringing work, than on its commercial nature. However, it is
suggested that this dictum does not give much guidance in situations where the allegedly
infringing use is both non-transformative and non-commercial, which it is suggested is the
case with respect to the Napster technology.
Justice Souter, who delivered the unanimous decision in Campbell, ruled that
parodies, like other comment and criticism, could claim transformative value as they
^"^ Id. at 579.
^'^
Id. at 579.
2"^ Id. at 579.
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"provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a
new one."^'** It is noteworthy that Justice Souter placed the focus of his enquiry, parodies,
in the context of the category of works classified as comment and criticism. It is
suggested that while Justice Souter' s "transformative" analysis was applicable in the
context of new works created to comment and criticize an "original" work, it is of limited
value when seeking to determine whether the digital downloading of music is a fair use
under the first statutory factor. As the Court had emphasized earlier in its analysis, each
fair use case is fact specific.
Further, Justice Souter underscored that while the transformative element was
important, it was not dispositive of the first factor. The weight to be attached to the
transformative element would vary depending on the commercial nature of the allegedly
infringing work. The result being that the more transformative the use, the less the
importance of other factors like commercialism.
With respect to the commercial element of the first fair use factor, Justice Souter
also dispelled prior views which held that in considering the first fair use factor, the
commercial nature of the new work should be given inflated significance. The Court
observed that the statutory language made it clear that the commercial or non-profit
purpose ofthe work is just one ofthe elements to be taken into account with regard to the
^** Id. at 579.
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first fair use enquiry?'*^ For example, an educational use that is not for profit might not
necessarily prohibit a finding of infringement, nor would commercial use bar a finding of
faimess.^^^ While commercial as opposed to nonprofit use is a separate factor that tends
to weigh against a finding of fair use, this tendency would vary in the context of each case.
The result being that there was no "hard presumptive significance" to the commerciality
element.^^^
In applying the transformative analysis discussed in Campbell to the facts of the
Napster case. Judge Patel also relied on the case of UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
MP3.COM, Inc.^^^ In that case, the issue before the District Court was whether the
defense of fair use was available to an internet company which made MP3 music files
available to its subscribers. The technology and service utilized by the defendant internet
company, differed from that utilized by Napster, Inc. In the case of MP3.Com, Inc., the
defendant purchased compact discs in which the plaintiffs owned the copyright, and made
unauthorized copies of those discs onto its computer servers in order that its subscribers
could download the music files free of charge. In order to benefit from this service, the
users were required to own a compact disc version of the recording. This is in contrast to
the Napster technology which allows for peer-to-peer sharing of music files (compact disc
recordings which are not required to be owned by the user), and which are not stored in
^"'Mat 584.
^^° Id. at 584.
"^ Id. at 585.
252 92 F.Supp.2d 349 (S.D. N.Y. 2000).
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any way on the Napster servers. However, similar to the Napster service, the service
provided by MPS.Com was free of charge to its subscribers.
In its analysis of the first fair use factor, the District Court in UMG Recordings
placed great emphasis on the commercial and transformative enquiries, and treated these
enquiries as dispositive in ruling against the defendant. The court held that the use by the
internet company's subscribers was commercial because the company was attempting to
broaden its subscription base to draw advertisers and otherwise make a profit.^^^
The District Court also held that the downloaded music files were not
transformative, and cited Campbell for the proposition that the first statutory fair use
factor also involves inquiring into whether the new use repeats the old, or whether it
transforms it by infusing it with new meaning or new understandings.^^"* The defendant
had argued that "space shifting," (which allowed subscribers to download music which
they already possessed on their personal compact discs, from any internet connection
without being required to move around with their personal compact discs), was
sufficiently transformative.^^' The District Court rejected this argument on the ground
that such space shifting merely amounted to repackaging of the recordings for
transmission through another medium.
^" /J. at 351.
"Vrf. at351.
"^ Mat 351.
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This was not an adequate basis for a claim to transformative use as no "new aesthetics,
new insights and understandings" were added to the original music recordings being
copied.2^^
Judge Patel in Napster, relied on this dicta in the UMG case in holding that there
was no transformative use by the Napster subscribers, and this fact weighed against a
finding of fair use under the first fector. It is contended that both Judge Patel and the
UMG court failed to recognize that while the "transformative" analysis was usefijl when
applied to the specific facts of Campbell, that is, whether a parody constituted fair use of
an original music recording, such analysis is of little significance when transported to the
arena of the digital downloading of music, in which no attempt is being made to comment
or criticize the original work. Further, it is highly debatable whether an MP3 music file
which drastically compresses data and reduces the size of the wave format of a compact
disc, cannot claim transformative value.
Judge Patel opted not to expressly adopt the UMG dictum that the downloading of
music files was commercial activity. Instead, the learned judge ruled that while the
downloading and uploading of MP3 music files may not be "paradigmatic commercial
activity,"^^^ such activity could not be classified as "personal use" in the "traditional
sense."^^^
^^* Mat 351.
"^ A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 1 14 F.Supp.2d 896, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
"*/c/. at912.
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The learned judge acknowledged that the Napster subscribers were generally not
benefiting financially fi-om their activities, and observed that:
[the] plaintiffs have not shown that the majority ofNapster users download music
to sell—that is, for profit. However, given the vast scale of Napster use among
anonymous individuals, the court finds that downloading and uploading MPS
music files with the assistance of Napster are not private uses. At the very least, a
host user sending a file cannot be said to engage in a personal use when
distributing that file to an anonymous requester. Moreover, the fact that Napster
users get for fi-ee something they would ordinarily have to buy suggests that they
reap economic advantages fi-om Napster use.^^^
Judge Patel's analysis of this issue is striking for its cryptic value. The learned
judge disclaims both commercial and personal use classification, while leaving the serious
question unanswered, what is the appropriate designation for the downloading and
uploading of music files. While the learned judge does not categorically rule that the
uploading and downloading of music files by the Napster users are commercial activities,
she appears to favor a commercial label by implicitly equating an economic advantage with
a commercial use. Judge Patel gives dispositive weight to the "economic advantages" to
be gained fi-om Napster use, ignoring the fact that Napster, Inc. did not charge a fee to its
subscribers, neither did the users profit financially fi-om their use.
It is asserted that one critical implication of Judge Patel's analysis is that it raises
the issue whether "personal use" can meaningfiilly exist in the context ofthe internet. The
very nature of the internet is that a massive audience of unknown individuals, across all
continents, can be connected simultaneously through computer networks and servers.
259 Mat 912.
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While millions of users can be connected at any given time, many of these users are
connected while in the privacy of their homes, either alone, or in the presence of close
family members. If, according to Judge Patel's analysis of the first fair use factor,
personal use turns on whether information is being transmitted to multiple anonymous
users, while ignoring whether the use is occurring in the privacy of one's home for one's
personal enjoyment, the logical extension of this argument seems to be that personal use
has no place in the internet environment.
(b) Sony Corporation ofAmerica v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,^^ is the
Supreme Court case often cited and discussed with reference to contributory copyright
infringement and the fair use doctrine. In this respect, the case was relied on by Napster,
Inc. in its arguments. In Sony, the owners of copyright in television programs brought a
copyright infringement action against manufacturers of home video recorders. The
plaintiEfs alleged that by supplying video recorders to consumers with which they could
videotape the plaintiffs' copyrighted works for home use, the defendants contributed to
the home user's infringement of the plaintiffs' copyrights. While Sony is important both
for its holdings on contributory infringement and the feir use doctrine, its articulation of
fair use principles is on focus in this Thesis.
260 464 US. 417 (1984).
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In a split decision, the Court first noted that in applying the fair use factors, a
Court is able to apply an "equitable rule of reason" analysis to particular infiingement
claims.^^' The Court emphasized that the legislative objective behind the fair use statutory
provision did not intend:
to fi-eeze the [fair use] doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid
technological change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use
is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be fi"ee to adapt the
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.^^^
In examining the first fair use factor, the Court focused on the commercial or non-profit
character of the activity in issue,^^^ and made no mention of the "transformative" element
later enunciated in the Campbell decision.
Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion in Sony, and noted that where the
infi-inging copies are made for a commercial or profit-making purpose, there is a
presumption that such use is unfair.^*^ However, in the circumstances of the case, time-
shifting (the home-use recording of copyrighted movies fi"om the television for delayed
private home viewing) was a noncommercial and nonprofit activity.^^^ As a result, the fact
that such home recording reproduced the entire original work did not militate against a
finding of feir use.^^ It should be noted that in the subsequent Campbell decision, the
^^' Id. at 448.
^^^ Id. at 450, quoting from KRep. No. 94-1476, pp. 65-66, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, p.
5680.
^" Id. at 449.
^" Id. at 449.
^^^
Id. at 449.
^^A/. at 449-50.
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Supreme Court clarified the Sony dictum with respect to the presumptive unfaimess of
commercial use, and observed that there is no need for a court to "elevate commerciality
to hard presumptive significance."^^^
In Napster, Judge Patel held that the Napster users gained an "economic
advantage" by obtaining the music files without payment, and the learned judge seemed to
equate such an advantage with commercial use.^^^ However, it is suggested that several
unique and important features of the case which negated such a commercial label, were
discounted by the learned judge. These features include: (1) Napster, Inc. was a non-
profit making company; (2) it did not charge a fee to the subscribers; (3) the music files
were being transmitted over the internet, which is inherently non-proprietary in nature; (4)
the music files were not stored on the Napster servers; (5) the Napster users generally
utilized the service in the privacy of their homes; and (6) the Napster users obtained the
music files for private enjoyment and not for commercial profit.
(c) Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.
In the case of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,^^^ the
issue before the Supreme Court was whether the unauthorized publication of verbatim
quotes fi"om President Ford's memoirs was a fair use of the stolen, unpublished
presidential manuscript. The Court in a split decision, first noted that fair use analysis
^" Campbell v. AcufF-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994).
2** A &M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 1 14 F.Supp.2d 896, 912-13 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
269 471 U.S. 539(1985).
69
requires a case-by-case determination and the four statutory factors were not exclusive.^^°
In analyzing the first fair use factor, the Court observed that the fact that a publication was
commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair
use.^^^ The Court held that:
The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the
use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit fi"om exploitation of the
copyrighted material without paying the customary price.^^^
The Court also took into account the defendant's express purpose in publishing the
unauthorized quotes, which was to "scoop" the authorized forthcoming publication. The
defendant's infiinging use:
"had not merely the incidental effect but the intended purpose of supplanting the
copyright holder's commercially valuable right of first publication. "^^^
Also relevant to a determination of the first statutory factor was the propriety of the
defendant's conduct, as fair use presupposes "good faith" and "good dealing."^^'* The
defendant "knowingly exploited a purloined manuscript," and therefore could not "offer
up the fiction of consent as justification." As a result of these matters, the first fair use
factor weighed against the defendant.
As with the Sony case, the Court in Harper & Row considered the commercial or
non-commercial nature ofthe infiinging work in analyzing the first fair use factor.
^™M at 549, 561.
"' Id. at 562.
"^ Id. at 562.
^'^ Id at 562.
274
Id. at 562.
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However, each Court held that commercial use was one factor which could weigh against
a finding of fair use in light of other factors. Further, each Court sought to adapt the
relevant fair use principles to the particular circumstances of the case. In Sony, the Court
recognized that time-shifting for home use was non-commercial, even though the VCR
was essentially a profit-making item.
In Harper & Row, the Court was particularly concerned with the fact that the
manuscript was stolen or "purloined," and the defendant knowingly exploited the
purloined work. It should be noted that the Court added the dimension of the defendant's
intent as an important consideration. The defendant had obtained a stolen manuscript and
had expressly stated that it intended to "scoop" the pending first publication ofthe original
work. Although the defendant alleged that news reporting was a fair use, it stood to profit
fi"om the publication of the "scooped" manuscript as it was "fi-ee to bid for the right of
extracting excerpts" from the manuscript, like its competitors.^''^
Neither of these cases mentioned the transformative element which was a
prominent feature of the later Campbell case in the context of a parody, and which also
featured in the District Court's ruling in Napster. It is suggested that while the Court in
Sony and Harper & Row attempted to marry the specific facts of their case with legal
principles, the District Court in Napster applied hard and fast rules without taking into
account the specific unique features of the case, namely the non-commercial nature ofthe
"^ Id. at 563.
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use by the Napster subscribers, the feet that the use generally occurred in the privacy of
the home, and the fact that Napster, Inc. did not charge for the service. The accuracy of
the ruling in Harper & Row with respect to the importance placed on the unpublished
nature of the manuscript, will be discussed in relation to the second statutory fair use
factor.
(d) Stewart v. Abend.
After Harper & Row, the Supreme Court decided the case of Stewart v.
Abend.^^^ One of the issues confronting the Court was whether the continued distribution
and publication of a movie, during the renewal copyright term of the pre-existing story on
which the movie was based, was a fair use ofthe story.
In its discussion of the fair use doctrine, the split Supreme Court first noted that
the doctrine was an equitable rule of reason and that the four enumerated statutory factors
were nonexclusive.^^^ The Court held that the motion picture did not fall into any of the
categories set out in the preamble of the statutory fair use provision, neither did it meet
the four criteria set out in the statutory fair use provision.^^^ In its analysis of the first fair
use fector, the Court cited the statement in Sony that [every]:
commercial use is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege
that belongs to the owner ofthe copyright...^^^
2^^ 495 U.S. 207(1990).
"^ Id. at 236-37.
^^* Id. at 237.
^^' Id. at 237, quoting from Sony Corp. ofAmerica v. Universal Studios, Inc., supra, note 260, 464 U.S.,
at 451.
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and held that the first fair use factor weighed against the petitioners because they earned
substantial profits fi*om the re-release of the movie during the renewal term. On this basis,
the Court rejected the argimient that the use was educational rather than commercial.^^^
As earlier mentioned in this Chapter, the subsequent Campbell decision clarified this
statement in Sony and held that there should be no hard presumptive significance attached
to a commercial use. All the elements of the case must be weighed in deciding on a fair
use argument.
The decision of the Court in Stewart can be contrasted with the ruling of the
District Court in Napster. In the former case, the Court gave significant attention to the
fact that the petitioners were deriving quantifiable economic benefits and profits fi"om the
movie, while the renewal rights in the original copyrighted work continued to exist. This
commercial advantage weighed against a finding of fair use. This situation can be
contrasted with the position in Napster, in which the defendant company did not earn any
profits fi-om the infringing use of its subscribers, neither did the users gain any quantifiable
economic benefits from the use.
(e) Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Maphia.
Two cases relied on by Judge Patel in her analysis of the first fair use factor were
the cases of Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Maphia^^^ and American Geophysical Union v.
2^ Id. at 237.
2" 857 F.Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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Texaco Inc?^^ In Sega, the plaintiff was the manufacturer and distributor of computer
video games, and it brought a copyright infringement action against a company engaged in
the business of running an electronic bulletin board. The evidence revealed that users of
the bulletin board uploaded and downloaded the plaintiffs video games, without the
plaintiffs authorization. In addition, the defendant, either directly or through an afiBliate
sometimes charged a fee to users of the bulletin board, or bartered for the opportunity to
download the plaintiffs games.^^^
In examining the &st fair use fector, the District Court observed that "to invoke
the fair use exception, an individual must possess an authorized copy of a literary
work."^^ This Thesis contends that there is no such broad restriction imposed on the fair
use defense in either the fair use statutory provision, or established Supreme Court
authorities interpreting the defense. While in Harper & Row, the Court was concerned
with the fact that the defendant was knowingly exploiting a stolen manuscript, there is
generally no stringent requirement imposed on a defendant who may unwittingly be in
possession of an unauthorized copy ofa work.
^^^ 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994)
2»3 Sega, 857 F.Supp. at 683.
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1992).
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The defense is raised after an allegation of copyright infringement has been made,
and according to the Supreme Court authorities cited in this Chapter, the statutory fair use
factors are to be applied on a case-by-case analysis, without the application of any hard
and fast rules. The defense requires the application ofan equitable rule ofreason.
The Sega court held that the first fair use factor weighed against a finding of fair
use because the users of the bulletin board were downloading the Sega games in order to
avoid having to buy video game cartridges from the Plaintiff, and by such avoidance, the
users and the defendant "both profit[ed]." The commercial purpose of the use therefore
militated against a finding of feir use.^*^
The court's implied conclusion appears to be that barring downloading of the
video games, users would purchase the game cartridges from Sega. However, there was
no statistical data presented in the case to suggest that this implicit conclusion was an
accurate reflection of real purchase trends of the defendant's subscribers. Further, it
should be noted that the defendant in Sega was in fact earning profits from the user's
activities by charging a fee, unlike the position in Napster, Inc. This Thesis proposes that
this non-commercial characteristic of the Napster service is a unique feature, which the
District Court could have given greater consideration.
^^^ Id at 687.
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(f) American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.
The American Geophysical case was decided after the Campbell decision. The
issue presented was whether the photocopying of individual journal articles by one of the
defendant's research scientists, was a fair use. The individual articles were photocopied
from scientific journals in which the plaintiff publishers held the copyright, upon
assignment by the authors of the articles.^^^ The plaintifis held prior subscriptions in the
journals, but the photocopies were made from journals in which no subscriptions were
held.
The majority court reiterated that in applying the fair use doctrine, the precise facts
at hand must be given consideration. ^^^ The court noted that the precise facts of the case
required an interpretation of the fair use doctrine in relation to the photocopying of
documents.^^^ The court expressed its reluctance in applying the traditional feir use
analysis as codified in the statutory provision and developed by judicial decisions, to the
issue of "mechanical" copying, but recognized that Sony rendered the point moot as that
case applied traditional fair use analysis to mechanical copying by a videotape recorder.^^
The court first observed that the four statutory fair factors were non-exclusive. In
analyzing the first fair use factor, the court stated that a pertinent enquiry is an
examination of the particular circumstances in which the copies are made. On the facts of
^^ 60 F.3d 913, 918 (2d Cir. 1994).
2*Vc/. at916.
2** Mat 916.
2»' Mat 917.
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the case, the court held that the primary purpose ofthe photocopying was "archival," that
is, the copies were created to provide each of the defendant's scientists with a personal
copy of the plaintifis' articles, without the defendant having to purchase another original
journal. This archival copying, while not always an unfair use, tilted the &st factor against
the defendant because the making of the copies to be placed on the shelf of the
defendant's scientist, was:
part of a systematic process of encouraging employee researchers to copy articles
so as to multiply available copies while avoiding payment.^^
The court held that a second relevant enquiry under the first fair use factor was the
issue of commercial use. Chief Judge Newman who rendered the decision of the split
court, recognized the dicta in earlier Supreme Court decisions which held that the
commercial nature of the use should not be unduly emphasized, but was simply one fector
which tended to weigh against fair use.^^'
Under the commercial use element, the court observed that the for-profit nature of
the defendant's activity should not weigh against the defendant without distinguishing
between direct commercial use, and the more indirect relation to commercial activity.
However, the court held that the for-profit status of the defendant company was not
"irrelevant to the fair use analysis."^^
^^ Id. ai 919-20.
2'' Mat 921.
^^ Jd. at 92\.
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While the court accepted that the defendant was not gaining any direct commercial
advantage from the photocopying of the articles, as it was done to facilitate the scientists'
research, there was an indirect commercial relation. The photocopying of the articles
would fecilitate the scientists' research, which would in turn lead to the development of
new products that could enhance the defendant's "commercial performance."^^^ The court
held that:
the greater the private economic rewards reaped by the secondary user (to the
exclusion of broader public benefits), the more likely the first factor will favor the
copyright holder and the less likely the use will be considered fair.^^"*
Since as a for-profit enterprise the defendant stood to gain an indirect economic advantage
from the photocopying, it was not obvious why it was fair for the defendant to avoid
payment to the copyright holders for the right to photocopy the articles.^^^
A third element that the court focused on in its first factor enquiry, was the
transformative issue. The court noted that under Campbell, this concept was "central to a
proper analysis under the first factor....although it [was] not absolutely necessary for a
finding of fair use."^^ The court observed that the transformative use concept is relevant
because "it assesses the value generated by the secondary use and the means by which
such value is generated."^^ However, the making of photocopies could not properly be
regarded as a transformative use of the copyrighted material, although the independent
2'Vc/. at921.
2'" Id. at 922.
2'^ Id. at 922.
^^ Id. ai 922-23.
^^'' Id. slX 923.
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value that stemmed from converting the original journal articles into a different format
from their normal appearance, should not be overlooked.^^^
Having considered these various elements, the court held that the first fair use
factor weighed against the defendant:
primarily because the dominant purpose of the use is a systematic institutional
policy of multiplying the available number of copies of pertinent copyrighted
articles by circulating the journals among employed scientists for them to make
copies, thereby serving the same purpose for which additional subscriptions are
normally sold, or,.., for which photocopying licenses may be obtained.^^
The differences between the American Geophysical case and the Napster case are
noteworthy. In the former case, the court was primarily concerned with the unauthorized
photocopying of documents and the fact that Texaco had originally paid for a subscription
to the articles, but had not renewed the subscription in order to benefit from the
unauthorized photocopies. Moreover, the court was of the view that the photocopying by
the defendants' scientists would assist the defendant to gain an indirect economic
advantage due to its for-profit status.
These features do not appear in the Napster litigation. Moreover, Judge Patel
treats the commercial and transformative elements as dispositive, while the Supreme Court
in Campbell holds that these elements are factors to be weighed along with all the other
unique factors of the case, and should be given due weight accordingly. As earlier
contended in this Thesis, Judge Patel failed to address the unique features of the Napster
2'^ /J. at 923.
^ Mat 924-5.
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case when transporting wholesale, the first factor fair use analysis of other judicial
authorities to the fects before her. For these reasons, it is suggested that the analysis of
the learned judge with respect to the first fair use factor is subject to question.
The Second Fair Use Factor
** the nature of the copyrighted work."
Judge Patel in the Napster case also found the second, third and fourth fair use
factors weighed against the defendant. With regard to the second feir use factor, the
learned judge held that since the copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings
were creative in nature, they constituted entertainment, and this fact weighed against a
finding of fair use.^^ This ruling is consistent with the position adopted in earlier Supreme
Court decisions in which the Courts distinguished between creative works, which required
greater copyright protection, and factual works, to which the public required greater
access.
In Campbell, the Court in its analysis of the second fair use factor, noted that this
factor drew on Justice Story's expression, the "value of the materials used."^^' The Court
observed that there were some works which are "closer to the core of intended copyright
protection than others, with the consequence that fair use is more diflBcult to establish"^^^
when these works are copied. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs original song
constituted creative expression for public dissemination, which fell within the core of
^ 1 14 F.Supp.2d 896, 913 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
^' 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas., at 348.
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copyright's protection. However, in the circumstances of the case, the copying of such an
expressive work was not helpful in analyzing the fair use doctrine, as parodies invariably
copied expressive works."^^'^
In Harper & Row, the Court stated that "the law generally recognizes a greater
need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fentasy."^^ While some of the
quotes taken fi"om the original work conveyed facts, the defendant also excerpted
subjective descriptions which formed part of the "author's individualized expression."^^^
Further, the fact that the original work was unpublished was a "critical element of its
nature," as the "scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished works."^^ It
should be noted that the Court's view with respect to the importance of the unpublished
nature of the work as a determining factor in a finding of unfair use, is not wholly
consistent with the U.S. Copyright Statute and the statutory fair use provision.^^^ The
unpublished nature of the work is not the dispositive element if the other factors under
consideration do not lead to a conclusion of unfair use.
^°^ Id. at 586.
^^ 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985),
^°^ Id. at 563.
^°*'/rf.at564.
307 17 U.S.C. § 107 (4) "The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itselfbar a finding of fair use ifsuch
finding is made upwi consideratioi of all the above factors."
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In Stewart v. Abend, the Court held that fair use is more likely to be found in
factual works than in fictional works, and a motion picture based on a fictional short story,
fell into the latter category.^^^
In Sega, the court adopted the position taken in Harper & Row, and held that the
video game programs were for entertainment uses and involved works of fiction and
fantasy. Therefore, the copying of such works also weighed against a finding of fair
use.^^
Conversely, in American Geophysical, the court found that the second feir use
factor favored the defendant as the articles that were photocopied were predominantly
factual in nature. Such works were not "within the core of the copyright's protective
purposes."^^*'
As the dicta in these cases illustrate, these select judicial interpretations of the
second factor are generally consistent with each other. The courts adopt the view that
there is a greater need to disseminate factual works to the public in order to achieve
copyright's constitutional objectives. As a result, there appears to be a greater likelihood
that a court would find a fair use when fectual works are used without the authority of the
copyright owner. On the other hand, with respect to works of creative expression, the
courts adopt the position that these works are within the core of copyright's protective
purpose and as such, there is less likelihood that unauthorized use of such works would be
^°* 495 U.S. 207, 237-38 (1990).
^ 857 F.Supp.679, 687 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
'*" 60 F.3d 913, 925 (2d Cir. 1995).
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considered a fair use. Judge Patel's decision to weigh the second fair use factor^against
the defendant is therefore consistent with established authority, as the music files
downloaded by the Napster subscribers constituted expressive works.
The Third Fair Use Factor
*'*' the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole."
The Fourth Fair Use Factor
*'* the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work."
In her analysis in the Napster case, Judge Patel linked the third and fourth fair use
factors. Therefore, this Thesis will link these factors in analyzing the judicial
interpretations of these elements. Judge Patel ruled that the uploading or downloading of
the MPS music files involved copying the entirety of the copyrighted work, and that such
entire copying weighed against a finding of fair use. Further, the learned judge held that
even after Sony, such copying of entire works for private home use would weigh against a
finding of fair use if it was likely to adversely affect the market for the copyrighted
work.^"
Before discussing the learned Judge's conclusion with respect to the effect ofSony
on this issue, it should be noted that the select judicial decisions examined in this Thesis
either adopt a quantitative, or a qualitative analysis ofthe third fair use factor. Several
311 Napster, 1 14 F.Supp.2d at 913.
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authorities consider the actual quantitative amount ofthe original work that is contained in
the infringing work. On the other hand, other authorities place greater emphasis on the
qualitative value of the portion ofthe original work included in the infringing work. In the
Napster situation. Judge Patel adopts the former view and considers the quantitative
amount of the original recordings used by the Napster subscribers (the entire works), and
weighs this factor against a finding of fair use. Such a conclusion is not subject to critical
review in light ofthe case law on the issue, which will be discussed later in this chapter.
On the other hand, it is suggested that Judge Patel's conclusion that after Sony,
copying of entire works for personal use may not be a fair use if it is likely to have an
adverse effect on the market for the original works, is not so clear-cut. The Court in Sony
characterized the activity of "time-shifting" as a non-commercial use. The Court held that
since time-shifting enabled a viewer to see a work which he had been invited to view free
of charge, the fact that the entire work was reproduced did not have "its ordinary effect of
militating against a finding of fair use."^^^ In its discussion ofthe fourth fair use factor, the
Court acknowledged that copying for noncommercial purposes could impair the copyright
holder's rights, but observed that:
a use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or the value
of, the copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to protect the author's
incentive to create.^ '^
^'2 Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50.
^" Id. at 450.
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In other words, it is suggested that the Court was of the view that in order to bar
noncommercial copying, there must be a demonstrable efifect on the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work. There must be actual proof of an adverse efifect. This
is diflferent to Judge Patel's interpretation when she ruled that after Sony, copying of entire
works for private home use would weigh ag£iinst a finding of fair use if it was likely to
adversely affect the market for the copyrighted work. It is contended that according to
Judge Patel's interpretation, a copyright holder may not be required to subscribe to such a
strict standard ofproof
The Sony Court distinguished between the evidentiary burden required when the
allegedly infringing use is commercial, from the evidentiary burden required when the use
is non-commercial, and ruled that:
...although every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an
unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the
copyright, noncommercial uses are a dtfiferent matter. A challenge to a
noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either that the particular
use is harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would adversely affect the
potential market for the copyrighted work....What is necessary is a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm
exists. If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be
presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be
demonstrated.^''*
Although there was a presumption that commercial use was unfair, noncommercial uses
did not fall into this category. With respect to a noncommercial use, there must be proof
by the copyright owner that "some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists,"
314 Mat 451.
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The Court validated the District Court's decision to reject the evidence presented
on the question of future harm. Two of the arguments made before the District Court in
Sony were: (1) live television viewing or movie audiences would decrease as more people
watched videotapes, and (2) theater or film rental of a program would suffer because of
time-shift recording.^^^ The District Court rejected these arguments and the Supreme
Court agreed with the findings. With respect to the first argument, the District Court held
that there was no factual basis for the argument and the survey produced by the
respondent did not demonstrate a negative effect on television viewing or theater
attendance.^ '^ With respect to the second argument, the District Court held that it lacked
merit as it was not supported by the evidence.
In ruling that the fourth fair use factor weighed against Napster, Inc., Judge Patel
accepted the evidence of the plaintiffs that the Napster usage harmed the market for the
original copyrighted works in two ways. First, the uploading and downloading of music
files reduced compact disc sales among college students. Secondly, the use by Napster
subscribers raised "barriers to [the] plaintifis' entry into the market for the digital
downloading of music."^^^
On the other hand, the defendant claimed three potential fair uses of the plaintiffs'
works, namely: (1) sampling, (2) space-sMftrng and (3) the authorized distribution ofnew
artists' work. Judge Patel ruled that unlike time-shifting, sampling was not a personal use
^^^ Id. at 453.
^'* Id. at 453, n 37
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in the traditional sense for several reasons. First, it allowed Napster users to obtain
permanent copies of copyrighted music that they would otherwise have to pay for, and
secondly, it carried the potential for viral distribution to millions of users.^'^ The learned
judge concluded that:
the global scale of Napster usage and the fact that users avoid paying for songs
that otherwise would not be free militates against a determination that sampling by
Napster users constitutes personal or home use in the traditional sense.^^^
Judge Patel appears to be of the view that barring the downloading of music files
on the Napster website, Napster users would readily purchase the original compact discs,
thus satisfying the royalty requirements due to copyright holders under the copyright
scheme. The conclusion arrived at by the plaintiffs' expert, based on a survey of a select
group of college students, was that:
the more songs Napster users have downloaded, the more likely they are to admit
or imply that such use has reduced music purchases. ^^°
This conclusion found favor with the learned judge. As discussed in Chapter I of this
Thesis, the statistics for the U.S. music industry in 1999 reflect an increase in compact disc
sales, and the defendant's evidence in Napster was that sales of the plaintifBFs' music was
enhanced.
^'*/c/. at913.
^"/ci. at914.
"° Id. at 909.
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The fact that a survey of a select group of college students can "imply" that compact disc
sales among college users have declined due to Napster usage, is scientifically ambiguous
and moreover, should be measured against the fact that overall sales in the country have
increased.
Judge Patel dismissed the defendant's contention that Napster use stimulated sales,
by noting that any such potential enhancement would not tip the fair use analysis
conclusively in favor of the defendant. The learned judge cited the MP3.Com decision as
"especially instructive."^^^
In MP3. Com, the court held that the fourth fair use factor weighed against the
defendant even though sales may have been enhanced, because the plaintifis provided
evidence that they had taken steps to enter the digital download market by entering into
various licensing agreements, and this market was affected adversely by the activity of the
defendant's users.^^ The court then made the extraordinary claim that:
copyright... is not designed to afford consumer protection or convenience but,
rather, to protect the copyright holders' property interests.^^^
It is argued that solely on the basis of this incorrect interpretation of the
constitutional purpose of U.S. copyright, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Sony and
Feist, the judgment in MP3.Com is dubious and should not have been afforded much
consideration in the Napster litigation. However, Judge Patel found the ruling instructive
^^' Id. at 914.
^^^ 92 F.Supp.2d 349, 351 (S.D. N.Y. 2000).
323 Mat 351.
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and proceeded to apply it. The learned judge accepted the evidence of the plaintiffs that
they had expended large sums of money "to commence internet sales and licensing for
digital downloads" and that widespread sampling, even assuming that it was a
noncommercial use, would likely have an adverse effect on their "entry into the online
market." Further, the unauthorized downloading to sample songs, deprived music
publisher plaintiffe of royalties for individual songs, and would not constitute fair use even
ifcompact disc sales were enhanced.^^''
It is suggested that this analysis by Judge Patel is subject to criticism for two
reasons. Firstly, it ignores the inherently non-proprietary nature of the internet by
impliedly recognizing the right of the plaintiffs to control the online market. Secondly, it
ignores the holding in Sony that if the infringing use is noncommercial, the plaintiffs must
demonstrate the harm that is caused. The fact that the plaintiffs' investment in the online
world is threatened by a competitor, is not the relevant consideration. The dispositive
issues are whether the market for the plaintiffs' music would be adversely affected, as well
as the market for derivative works, and whether there is proof of such an adverse effect.
The statistics for the U.S. music industry for 1999 suggested that CD sales had increased
over previous years, which negates such an adverse effect. It is suggested that Judge Patel
shifted the focus in her analysis, from considering the impact on the market for the work,
to that of protecting the fiiture business endeavors of the plaintiffs.
324 Napster, 1 14 F. Supp., at 915.
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In Campbell, the Court observed that the facts to be taken into consideration with
respect to the third fair use statutory factor will link with the first and fourth factors.^^^
With respect to the fourth fair use factor, the Court stated that consideration must be
given to the extent of market harm caused by the particular acts of the infiinger, as well as
whether the unrestricted and widespread conduct engaged in by the infringer would
substantially and adversely impact upon the potential market for the original work and its
authorized derivative works.^^^ The enquiry must consider harm to the original and harm
to the market for derivative works. The proponent relying on the feir use defense must
demonstrate fevorable evidence about relevant markets.^^^ However, the Court noted
that market harm is a question of degree and the importance of this factor would vary with
the amount of harm and with the strength of the showing on the other factors.^^*
It is contended that nothing in this ruling points to consideration being given to
evidence of potential harm to the business enterprise in which the plaintiff is seeking to
enter. Instead, the Court is emphasizing that there must be harm to the original
copyrighted work or harm to the market for works derived from that original work. In
addition, the proponent of the fair use doctrine must put forward evidence concerning
relevant markets. In Napster, the defendant's evidence that overall sales of the plaintiffs'
copyrighted music had increased was rejected by the court.
^"510 U.S. 569, 586-7 (1994).
^^* Id. at 590.
^^^
Id. at 590.
^^ Id. dXS9\.
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In Harper & Row, in analyzing the third fair use factor, the Court considered the
qualitative value of the excerpts taken from the original work instead of the quantity
used.^^^ With respect to the fourth statutory factor, the Court held that "this last factor is
undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use."^^^ This view was dispelled
subsequently in Campbell, as that Court held that the four fair use factors should be
considered together.
The Court in Harper & Row, found evidence of an actual harmful effect on the
market as there was a cancellation of the planned serialization of the authorized
manuscript as a result of the unauthorized publication.^^ ^ The Court also placed great
emphasis on the fact that the quotes were taken from an unpublished manuscript and that
the failure to obtain the copyright holder's consent to use prepublication quotations from
the unpublished manuscript, posed a "potential for damage to the marketability of &st
serialization rights in general."^^^ As earlier mentioned, the Court's emphasis on the
unpublished nature of the original manuscript in finding unfair use, is not supported by the
statutory fair use provision.
As can be seen in this case, the Court gave consideration to solid evidence ofharm
to the market for the original work, as there was a cancellation of serialization rights.
Conversely, Judge Patel gave consideration to a survey conducted on a select group of
"'471U.S. 539, 566(1985).
"" Id. at 566.
"> Id. at 566.
"^ Id. at 569.
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college students, as evidence of harm to the college market, while ignoring the fact that
overall sales ofcopyrighted music in the U.S. had increased.
In Stewart v. Abend, the Court held that the third and fourth statutory factors
weighed against a finding of fair use. With respect to the third statutory factor, the
original story formed a substantial part of the movie, the derivative work. The movie used
the story's "setting, characters, plot, and sequence of events."^^^ With regard to the
fourth statutory factor, the Court (also adopting the view that this factor was the most
important) ruled that the evidence demonstrated that the re-release of the movie
"impinged on the ability to market new versions of the story."^^
It is suggested that the Court was concluding that the abUity to produce authorized
derivative works of the original story was being impeded. This analysis in relation to
derivative works cannot be transported to the Napster situation as there were no
derivative works in issue in that case. The record company plaintiffs were ofthe view that
the Napster usage was impeding their entry into the market for digital downloading.
However, there was no evidence that they were unable to market "new versions" of their
works. Instead, it is contended that the court was being asked to protect an imminent
business venture.
^^' 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990).
'^ Id. at 238.
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The Sega court also adopted the position of Supreme Court decisions prior to
Campbell, that the fourth factor was the most important. ^^^ The court observed that since
there were 45,000 similar bulletin boards in operation throughout the country, it was
"obvious" that if the copying became widespread there would be an adverse effect on the
market for the copyrighted video games. Such an adverse effect weighed "heavily against
a finding of fair use."^^^ The court made this sweeping assumption based on the number
of bulletin boards in existence without any proof that these boards were affecting the
market for the copyrighted games.
In American Geophysical, the court observed that with respect to the third fair use
factor, each of the eight discrete articles that was copied enjoyed independent copyright
protection and the defendant copied each article in its entirety. As a result, such
photocopying of entire works militated against a finding of fair use. The court linked the
third factor to the first fair use factor, and noted that by photocopying the works in their
entirety, this emphasized that the predominant purpose and character of the use was to
establish a personal library for the defendant's scientists.^^^
In assessing the fourth statutory factor, the court recognized that prior to
Campbell, the Supreme Court had ruled that the fourth factor was of primary importance.
However, Campbell abandoned that notion and instructed that all the factors were to be
weighed together. The court noted that it was important to have regard to the peculiar
"* 857 F. Supp. 679, 687-8 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
'^ Id. at 688.
^" 60 F.3d 913, 926 (2d Cir. 1994).
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nature of the copyrighted works. The copyrighted works were individual articles
contained in a journal, and while there was a market for journals, there may not be a
market for the individual articles contained in a journal. ^^^
The court considered two main elements under the fourth factor: (1) the effect on
the marketability ofjournal subscriptions, and (2) the effect on licensing revenues. With
respect to the effect on the marketability ofjournal subscriptions, the court felt that on the
evidence presented, this element only slightly tipped the fourth factor in favor of the
publishers, as the loss of a few journal subscriptions did not necessarily mean that the
individual articles had lost their marketability.^^^
On the other hand, with respect to the effect on licensing revenues, the court held
that this element primarily favored the publishers. The court observed that through the
Copyright Clearance Center, there was a viable market for institutional users to obtain
licenses to make photocopies of individual articles, and this potential to earn licensing
revenues, which was lost by the unauthorized photocopying, was a relevant consideration
in the fourth factor feir use analysis. It demonstrated that the publishers suffered
substantial harm to the value of their copyrights.^'*^
In the Napster case, Judge Patel was concerned with the fact that the plaintiffs had
spent large sums and "effort to commence internet sales and licensing for digital
^^* Id. at 926-7.
"' Id. at 929.
^^°/d at 930-1.
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downloads."^''^ The view being espoused seems to be that this "sweat of the brow" (a
concept specifically rejected in the Supreme Court decision of Feist) should be rewarded,
and the plaintiffs' attempt to enter into the online market should be protected. It is
noteworthy that an important factor in the analysis in the American Geophysical case was
that Texaco was a for-profit company. The same cannot be said for Napster, Inc. It is
suggested that this significant distinguishing feature makes American Geophysical less
relevant to the particular circumstances of the Napster case.
Judge Patel next looked at the claim by the defendant that space-shifting was a fair
use and should be protected in an analogous manner to time-shifting under the principles
enunciated in Sony. In making this argument, the defendant relied on the case of
Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems Inc.^'^
In that case, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the manufacture and distribution by the
defendant of a small portable music device known as the Rio. With this device, a user
could "space shift" music files, that is, download MP3 audio files already contained on a
computer hard drive, to the Rio, and listen to them anywhere.^'*^
The lawsuit filed by the RIAA alleged that the Rio did not comply with the
requirements contained in the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992^^ for digital audio
recording devices because it did not employ a Serial Copyright Management System. The
^"^ Napster, 114 F.Supp.2d 896, 914.
^''^ 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
^'^^
Id. at 1073.
^'"nU.S.C. §1001etseq.
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plaintiffs also sought royalties from the defendant. The court held that the Rio facilitated
personal use under the home taping exemption provision of the Audio Home Recording
Act. The court observed that such copying of music files is "paradigmatic noncommercial
personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the Act."^^ The fair use doctrine
was not raised in the court's discussion and analysis.
Judge Patel ruled that the Diamond case was irrelevant to the matter before her
because the plaintiffs did not raise any claims under the Audio Home Recording Act (the
Audio Act), and further, there was no evidence that space shifting was a significant use of
the Napster service.^"*^ It is suggested that Judge Patel's dismissal of the relevance of the
Diamond decision is not subject to serious query as the provisions of the Audio Act were
not in issue before the court in the Napster litigation. Further, the contentious issue in
Diamond was whether the dovmloading of music (already saved on a computer hard
drive) to the Rio was a personal use, not whether the downloading of copyrighted music
from the internet to a computer hard drive was a fair use, as was the issue in Napster.
With respect to the defendant's argument that the new artist's program was a fair
use, Judge Patel noted that the plaintiffs' did not seek an injunction on this issue.^"*^
Having considered the statutory fair use provision. Judge Patel ruled against the defendant
on all four fair use factors and granted the preliminary injunction that was sought by the
plaintiffs.
^^ Id. at 1079.
^'** Napster, 114 F.Siipp.2d 896, 916.
^'' Id. ax 917.
96
On appeal, the matter was heard before the Ninth Circuit/'^^ Circuit Judge Beezer
rendered the decision of the court, and upheld the decision of the District Court on the
issue of the feir use defense. With respect to the first fair use factor, the purpose and the
character of the use, the court considered the transformative and commercial elements and
held that Judge Patel's findings on these issues were not clearly erroneous.^^ The court
also ruled that under this factor:
direct economic benefit is not required to demonstrate a commercial use. Rather,
repeated and exploitative copying of copyrighted works, even if the copies are not
offered for sale, may constitute a commercial use.^^^
The court cited the case of Woridwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of
God^^' for this proposition.
In that case, both the appellant and the appellee were nonprofit religious
organizations. The appellant owned the copyright in a book which the appellee used in its
religious observances. In order to facilitate its religious observances, the appellee copied
the book in its entirety and distributed the copies to its members and the public. The issue
before the court was whether such copying and distribution was a fair use of the original
book.'52
In its discussion of the first fair use factor, the court considered the transformative
and commercial elements. In analyzing the commercial element, the court observed that
^* Nos. 00-16401, 00-16403, 2001 WL 1 15033 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 2001).
''" Id. al* 7.
^5' 227 F. 3ci 1 1 10 (9th Cir. 2000).
"^A/. at 1112.
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for the purpose of "profit," monetary gain was not the sole criterion. The court held that
the appellee "profited" fi-om the copying, in the sense of gaining an advantage or benefit:
(1) by providing the core text to its members, which was essential to their religious
observances, (2) by attracting through distributions of the copies, new members who
"tithe ten percent of their income" to the appellee, and (3) by achieving growth in the
membership during the period that copies were distributed. Based on these
considerations, the court held that the first factor weighed against a finding of fair use.^^^
It is to be observed that while the court stated that "profit" did not equate with
monetary gain, there was an element of monetary gain for the appellee which resulted
fi-om the tithing system. This is difierent to the Napster situation in which there was no
pecuniary advantage for Napster, Inc. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit in Napster, relied
on the Worldwide case as authority for the proposition that evidence of direct economic
benefit was not vital to the analysis of the first fair use factor. Instead, evidence of
"repeated and exploitative copying of copyrighted works....may constitute a commercial
use," and the Ninth Circuit was ofthe view that the plaintiffs provided such evidence.^^'*
With respect to the second and third fair use factors, the Ninth Circuit found no
error with Judge Patel's conclusions,^^^ and then turned its attention to the fourth fair use
factor.
^"M at 1117.
^^ Nos. 00-16401, 00-16403, 2001 WL 1 15033, at * 7 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 2001).
"' Id. at *8.
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The court noted Judge Patel's reliance on the evidence of the plaintiffs' experts and held
that there was no basis to disturb the learned judge's findings on the issue of proof of
harm to the market for the plaintiSs' works.^^^ The court added that:
...lack of harm to an established market cannot deprive the copyright holder of the
right to develop alternative markets for the works Here, similar to...UMG
Recordings, the record supports the district court's finding that the "record
company plaintifis have already expended considerable funds and effort to
commence internet sales and licensing for digital downloads." Having digital
downloads available for fi-ee on the Napster system necessarily harms the copyright
holders' attempts to charge for the same downloads.^^^
The questionable dicta expressed in UMG Recordings has already been discussed
in the analysis of Judge Patel's ruling in the District Court. The Ninth Circuit relies on
that dicta and it is argued, makes a similar error to that made by Judge Patel. Both courts
fail to distinguish between the copyright holder's right to market his original work and
create and/or license derivative works, fi"om an attempt to lay claim to a business
enterprise not yet entered. Moreover, the business enterprise to which a protective claim
is being made, is to be conducted in the non-proprietary realm of the internet. Both courts
also fail to adapt the fair use principles to the unique features of the litigation, while they
transport dicta wholesale fi"om other factual situations to the circumstances in issue. For
these reasons, it is suggested that the analysis of the first and fourth fair use factors in the
Napster litigation is subject to question.
^5* Id. at *9.
^"/i^.at* 10.
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The outcome of the Napster litigation in the setting of Trinidad and Tobago, may
have seen a similar result to that which obtained in the U.S. As previously mentioned in
this Thesis, copyright in the Trinidad and Tobago legislation is a property right. The
primary objective of copyright in the legislation of that jurisdiction is to benefit the
copyright holder and there is no benevolent underlying public interest objective. The
Copyright Act, 1997 allows for the unauthorized reproduction of a copyrighted work,
"where the reproduction is made by a natural person exclusively for his own personal
purposes."^^* However, such unauthorized copying is not permitted in several situations,
including:
cases where reproduction would conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or
would otherwise unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the owner of
copyright.^^^
Similarly, the unauthorized use of a work in which a neighbouring right subsists, such as a
sound recording, is permitted in several situations including, "the use by a natural person
exclusively for his own personal purposes."^^
The Copyright Act also makes reference to permitted unauthorized reproduction
of a quotation^^' fi^om an authorized work and the unauthorized reproduction of a work
for teaching purposes by way of illustration, if "compatible with fair dealing."^^^ The
^^* The Copyright Act of Trinidad and Tobago 1997, section 9(1) available at
www.sice.oas.org/int_prop/nat_leg/Trinidad/L8_i.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2001).
"' Id. at section 9(2) (e).
^ Id. at section 25 (a).
'^' /J. at section 10(1).
^" Mat section 11(1) (a).
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concept of "fair dealing" has not been defined in the Act, but it has been said that it is
equivalent to the fair use doctrine in the U.S., although the feir use provisions are more
generous."'^"'
Since the fair dealing limitation on copyright in Trinidad and Tobago does not
extend to the type of use engaged in by the Napster subscribers, it is suggested that the
permitted use for "personal purposes" is of relevance.
The Copyright Act does not define "personal purposes", however, the Act defines
"communication to the public" as information that can be perceived by persons outside the
family circle or closest social acquaintances.^^ Further, several English judicial decisions
have interpreted the meaning of public as opposed to private use. It is suggested that the
arguments of Napster, Inc. would have failed in the Trinidad and Tobago context for two
principal reasons. Firstly, in light of English judicial decisions, the use by the Napster
subscribers would not have been considered for "personal purposes." Secondly, in the
unlikely event that the courts held that the use was for personal purposes, the qualification
on permissible unauthorized "personal use" reproduction, namely, that permissible
personal copying would not extend where it conflicted with the copyright holder's
"normal exploitation of the work or would otherwise unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests" of the copyright owner, would weigh against Napster, Inc.
'" Peter J. Groves, Sourcebook on Intellectual Property Law, 417 (Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1997).
^^ The Copyright Act of Trinidad and Tobago 1997, supra note 358, at section 3.
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In the consolidated cases of Ernest Turner Electrical Instruments, Limited v.
Performing Right Society, Limited & Performing Right Society, Limited v. Gillette
Industries, Limited,^^^ the English Court of Appeal was asked to determine whether
music played over loudspeakers at a factory to alleviate the boredom of the employees,
was a performance "in public," The facts revealed that the factory owners employed 500
to 600 persons at their factory. In order to alleviate the employees' boredom and to
increase efficiency and output, the owners relayed to the employees, music programs
broadcast by the BBC and also gramophone records played at the factory and transmitted
by means of amplifiers and loud speakers.^^ The Performing Right Society owned the
sole right to perform the works in public and instituted a copyright infiingement action.
One of the arguments raised in defense was that the music was not being performed "in
pubUc."
Lord Greene M.R., delivered the judgment of the Court and first noted the
property right objective of copyright when he ruled that:
the owner of the copyright is entitled to be paid for the use of his property unless
and until the legislature otherwise determines, and he is entitled to be paid for it
even if its use concerns the public wehare.^^^
The learned Master of the Rolls then cited with authority the case of Jennings v.
Stephens,^^^ and the statement made in that case that "the question whether an
^" [1943] Ch. 167.
'^/<i. at 168.
368 Id at 171, see [1936] Ch. 469.
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entertainment is given in public or in private depends.... solely upon the character of the
audience."^^^ Lord Greene observed that the nature of the audience in the matter before
him put the "matter beyond doubt" that the performances were "in public""'^^ as opposed
to being "in private".
In his view, the audience constituted part of the working population and these
'Svorkpeople" were enjoying music they would normally listen to during their leisure
hours.^^^ Also of primary relevance to the issue, was the relationship of the audience to
the owner of the copyright, and not the relationship between the audience and the
performers (in this case the employers).^^^ Lord Greene noted that:
when the legislature, by the Copyright Act, conferred on the owner of copyright a
monopoly, it, no doubt, intended that that monopoly should be a real, and not an
illusory, right of property, and it is....important to consider whether a particular
performance is calculated to whittle down that monopoly to any substantial
extent. ...To discover the real nature of the audience and the effect on the
monopoly of treating these performances as private performances, it seems to me
to be relevant to consider what the result would be if performances of this kind
were given in all the other factories in the country. The result would be that the
employers of millions of workpeople would be giving to those workpeople without
payment the fruit of the brains, skill, imagination, and taste of various authors and
composers....without any remuneration to him or them, and would be getting the
advantage of that work, taste and skill, in obtaining increased or improved output.
The effect would be largely to destroy the value of the statutory monopoly by
depriving the owners of copyright of the exclusive right to sell their goods to the
pubUc.^'^
^^M at 171, see [1936] Ch. 469, 482 per Romer L.J.
"°W. at 171-2.
"' Id. at 171-2.
^^2 Mat 172.
"^M at 173-4.
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It is noteworthy that these sentiments of Lord Greene, uttered more than 50 years
ago in the context of U.K. copyright law and factory workers, would find themselves
similarly echoed in the Napster litigation by Judge Patel, in the context of U.S. copyright
law and the internet. In both cases, the court considered the repercussions on the
copyright holder's economic interests in the face of millions of potential users, and found
that the use could not be considered "personal" in such a situation. However, a significant
difference in both cases is that in the context of the factory workers, the music was being
enjoyed in a work environment, while in the Napster litigation, the music was generally
being enjoyed in the privacy of one's home.
In a concurring opinion in the Ernest Turner case. Lord Justice Goddard drew a
clearer distinction between "public" and "private". The learned Lord Justice agreed that
the primary criterion was the character of the audience,^^'* and noted that a good test of
that character is whether:
the audience [is] one which the owner of the copyright could fairly consider a part
of his public. ..in selling a piece of music or a gramophone record, the owner of the
copyright contemplates that it will be played, and consents to it being played, by
the purchaser and he expects, not that it will be enjoyed in solitude, but that it will
be heard by members of the purchaser's household and his guests. If an action for
damages or penalties were tried by a jury, and thus direction were given to them,
they could without difficulty and by a mere application of their common sense
decide whether the audience in any particular case exceeded what could feirly be
described as a private or domestic audience.^^^
""Mat 175.
"^M. at 176.
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It is suggested that implicit in this dictum. Lord Justice Goddard recognized that a private
use occurred when enjoyed in the user's home.
Another case which considered the issue of public as opposed to private use was
the case of Performing Right Society Limited v. Harlequin Record Shops Limited.^^^
The issue before the court was whether the playing of recorded music in a record shop,
over a loudspeaker system to entice would-be purchasers, could be considered a
performance "in public". The court agreed that in making a determination on the issue,
the character of the audience is the decisive factor. The court further noted that:
...a performance given to an audience consisting of the persons present in a shop
which the public at large are permitted, and indeed encouraged to enter without
payment or invitation with a view to increasing the shop owner's profit can only
properly be described as a performance in public. ^^^
In the Australian case of Australian Performing Rights Association Ltd. v.
Telstra Corporation Ltd.,^^^ it was held that the playing of recorded music to a
telephone caller while "on hold" was "in public" use. The court further held that:
where a work is performed in a commercial setting, the occasion is unlikely to be
private or domestic and the audience is more appropriately to be seen as a section
of the public.
The dicta in these cases suggest that under the Trinidad and Tobago legislation,
the activities of the Napster subscribers could arguably be considered "personal purposes"
^^^ [1979] F.S.R 233, also available at [1979] 2 All E.R 828, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 851, (1979) 123 S.J. 421.
"^ Id. at 239.
'^* August 14, 1997, available at http://www.austlii.edaau/au/cases/cth/high_ct/unrep.338.html and cited
in Russell Frame, The Protection and Exploitation ofIntellectual Property Rights on the Internet: The
Way Forward For the Music Industry, I.P.Q. 1 999, 4, 444-470, 45 1
.
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for two main reasons. First, the activities were generally conducted in the privacy of the
home, and secondly, Napster, Inc. did not profit financially fi"om the use by the Napster
subscribers, as the subscribers were not charged a fee for the service.
However, the vexing issue of the number of potential users and the effects of such
multiple unauthorized use, cannot be easily disregarded. As can be seen fi-om the Ernest
Turner litigation, the idea that millions of factory workers could enjoy the unauthorized
musical recordings with damaging repercussions for the copyright owners, troubled the
court. Similarly, this was a concern for Judge Patel in the Napster litigation. In addition,
the Trinidad and Tobago legislation provides that even use for personal purposes could be
an infringement of copyright, if the unauthorized reproduction conflicts with the normal
exploitation of the work or could prejudice the legitimate interests ofthe copyright owner.
It is suggested that this broad provision would cover the concerns of the copyright holder
when faced with such multiple use as occurred in the Napster litigation, and could
influence a court faced with such unauthorized multiple use, to rule in favor of the
copyright holder.
As is illustrated by the Napster case, the fair use doctrine may be of limited value
to users in the internet arena. The global span of the internet, which links millions of users
at any given time poses real concerns for the owners of copyrighted material disseminated
online. Conversely, the fair use doctrine, a traditional limitation on copyright in the U.S.,
is perhaps being eroded out of concern that unchecked global use would dismantle
statutory monopolies. The future ofthe fair use doctrine in the ever changing
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technological environment is of concern not only to copyright holders, but also to users.
Chapter IV of this Thesis will consider what the future holds for the development or the
decline ofthe doctrine.
CHAPTER IV
THE AFTERMATH OF NAPSTER:
FAm USE AND "DIGITAL AGE" LEGISLATION
The victory afforded to the copyright owners in the Napster litigation, and the
concomitant rejection of the fair use defense in the context of the digital distribution of
music, may be seen as a reflection of the stance adopted by U.S. policy makers and
legislators to the impact of the internet on traditional legal interests. U.S. policymakers
have been concerned for several years with strengthening the intellectual property
legislative framework and the rights of copyright owners, to meet the challenges of the
new technological environment. Such growing concern is not unique to the U.S., and is
shared by other countries across the globe which recognize that existing intellectual
property legislation may not be adequate to keep pace with the innovative legal issues
presented in the digital age.
On December 20, 1996, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), an
agency of the United Nations created to deal with international intellectual property
matters, adopted two new treaties dealing with copyright law.^^^ These Treaties were
adopted at a diplomatic conference held by WIPO in Geneva. ^^°
"' Julie S. Sheinblatt, The WIPO Copyright Treaty, 13 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 535 (1998).
^^ Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 1 1 1 F.Supp.2d 294, 314 (S.D. N.Y. 2000).
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The Treaties are the WIPO Copyright Treat/^^ (the Copyright Treaty) and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty^^^ (the Performances Treaty).
Both Treaties were created to provide model provisions for inclusion in the
domestic legislation of the contracting parties to the Treaties, and, among other things,
"to introduce new international rules... to provide adequate solutions to the questions
raised by economic, social, cultural and technological developments."^^^ One of the
objectives of the Copyright Treaty is to develop and maintain the protection of the rights
of authors in their literary and artistic works in light of technological developments,^**
while one of the goals of the Performances Treaty is to develop and maintain the
protection of the rights of performers and producers of phonograms. The Performances
Treaty defines a phonogram as:
the fixation of the sound of a performance or of other sounds, or of a
representation of sounds, other than in the form of a fixation incorporated in a
cinematographic or other audiovisual work.^*^
This definition encompasses sound recordings as defined in the U.S. and Trinidad and
Tobago copyright legislation.
^*' The WIPO Copyright Treaty, available at http://\vww.wipo.org/treaties/ip/copyright/copyright.htinl
(last visited May 9, 2001).
'*^ The WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, available at
http://www.wipo.org/treaties/ip/performances/performances.html (last visited May 9, 2001).
'*^ See Preamble to the Copyright Treaty and the Preamble to the Performances Treaty.
^^ See Preamble to the Copyright Treaty.
^*' Supra note 382, at Article 2.
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Both the U.S. and the European Union contributed to the drafting of the
Treaties,^^^ and each Treaty shall "enter into force three months after 30 instruments of
ratification or accession by States have been deposited with the Director General of
^PQ ,,387 p^ ^^ ^pj^ J 5^ 2001, the Copyright Treaty had 24 ratifications and accessions
by States, including the U.S., while the Performances Treaty had 22 ratifications and
accessions by States, including the U.S.^*^ The U.S. Senate ratified U.S. accession to both
treaties in late 1998,^^^ and Congress passed the Digital Millenium Copyright Act^^
(DMCA) to amend the U.S. Copyright Statute and to implement both Treaties into
domestic legislation.^^'
The objective of the DMCA is to bring U.S. copyright law "squarely into the
digital age."^^ During the legislative deliberations on the bill prior to enactment, the
congressional committees in their debates were concerned with achieving a balance
between two priorities, namely: (1) promoting the continued development of electronic
commerce, and (2) protecting intellectual property rights. ^^^ The traditional manner of
achieving this balance was to fiirther the objectives ofthe copyright clause by:
^^ Mark Wing & Ewan Kirk, Et4ropean/U.S. Copyright Law Reform: Is a Balance Being Achieved,
I.P.Q. 2000, 2, 138-163, 157.
'*' See Article 20 ofthe Copyright Treaty and Article 29 of the Performances Treaty.
'** See http://www.wipo.org/treaties/docs/engIish/u-page31.doc (last visited May 9, 2001).
^^ Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation For the "Digital Millenium ", 23 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts
137(1999).
^^112 Stat 2860 (1998).
^"A/. at Preamble.
'^ David Nimmer, A RiffOn Fair Use In the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 148 U. Pa L. Rev. 673,
680 (2000).
^'^ Id. at 683.
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regulating the use of information...not the devices or means by which the
information is delivered or used by information consumers...and by ensuring an
appropriate balance between the interests of copyright owners and information
394
users.
However, the congressional committees were of the view that with the expansion of
technology, new sources of concern were emerging, and observed that
:
the digital environment poses a unique threat to the rights of copyright owners,
and as such, necessitates protection against devices that undermine copyright
interests. In contrast to the analog experience, digital technology enables pirates
to reproduce and distribute perfect copies of works at virtually no cost at all to the
pirate. As technology advances, so must our laws.^^^
The congressional committees sought to keep pace with new technology by
incorporating the anti-circumvention provisions of the Treaties into the new legislation,^^
and by extension, into U.S. copyright law.^^^ Article 1 1 of the Copyright Treaty requires
contracting parties to provide legal protection and effective legal remedies against the
"circumvention of effective technological measures" used by authors in the exercise of
their rights under the Treaty or the Berne Convention, and which restrict acts which are
not authorized by the authors or permitted by law.
Article 12 requires that legal remedies be made available against persons who
knowingly remove or alter electronic rights management information without authority, or
who knowingly distribute, import for distribution, broadcast or communicate to the public
^^'^
Id. at 683, quoting from the Report ofthe House Comm. on Commerce, RR. Rep. No. 105-551, at 24
(1998).
^'^ Id. at 683-684,quoting from the Report ofthe House Comm. on Commerce, RR Rep. No. 105-190, at
25.
^^ Id. at 684.
^''
Id. at 675.
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without authority, works in which electronic rights information has been removed or
altered. The Article defines "rights management information" as any information
identifying the work, its author, the owner of any right in the work, or information about
the terms and conditions of use of the work. Articles 1 1 and 12 of the Copyright Treaty
are mirrored in Articles 18 and 19 of the Performances Treaty.
The DMCA implements these Articles in its provisions,^^* and it can be argued that
this legislation demonstrates an inclination by U.S. legislators to further extend the reach
of the statutory monopoly granted by copyright. As cases such as Sony and Diamond
Multimedia discussed in Chapter III illustrate, several courts in interpreting the provisions
of the U.S. Copyright Statute, were hesitant to extend the copyright holder's monopoly
over devices that could be used for substantial non-infiinging purposes. On the other
hand, courts applying the provisions of the DMCA should have no such qualms, as this
legislation not only targets the act of copying itself, but also devices and conduct that
facilitate and enable copying.^^ It has been said that in this manner, the monopoly granted
by copyright has been extended.""^
The DMCA provides that:
no person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under this title.'*®'
^'*
1 12 Stat 2860, at §1201 and §1202.
^^ Nimmer, supra note 392, at 684.
'^ Id. at 684.
'^'112 Stat 2860, at §1201 (a).
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This provision is said to be the "basic provision" and the core of the anti-circumvention
violations.'*^ It has been equated with "breaking into a castle," as the act of invasion
inside the owner's property is itself the offense.'*^^ The prohibited act targeted by this
provision does not involve any issue of copyright infringement.'**^
The DMCA further prohibits anyone who shall:
manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any
technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that..(A) is
primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title; (B)
has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under
this title; or (C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that
person with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.'*"'
This provision is said to be the "ban on trafficking provision."^*^ Instead of targeting
those who unlawfully enter another's property, it targets those who "facilitate penetration
of the stronghold."'*^ This provision applies to, and targets products and devices that are
primarily designed to infringe or have only "limited commercial significance other than to
infringe."^*
^^ Nimmer, supra note 392, at 684.
^^ Id. at 686.
""^ Id. at 686.
'^M 12 Stat 2860, at §1201 (2) (A).
^ Nimmer, supra note 392, at 684-5.
^^ Id. at 687.
^°* Id. at 687-8.
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The DMCA also prescribes for an "additional violations" provision, which is
separate and distinct from the basic provision, and the almost identically worded ban on
trafiBcking provision."*^ The "additional violations" provision states that:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
that.. .(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing
protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a
copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof; (B) has only limited
commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent protection
afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright
owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof; or (C) is marketed by that
person or another acting in concert with that person with that person's knowledge
for use in circumventing protection afforded by a technological measure that
effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a
portion thereof"*'^
The subtle distinctions among the three anti-circumvention provisions are noteworthy.
The "basic provision" applies where there is prohibited access to a work protected by a
technological measure, while anyone assisting a person gain prohibited access, by publicly
offering a device to achieve such access, has violated the "ban on trafiBcking" provision.'*"
The "additional violations" provision applies where a third party publicly offers a device or
service to achieve the circumvention of copyright protection that is afforded by a
technological measure.'*'^
In other words, while the "basic provision" and the "ban on trafiBcking provision"
target the initial act of gaining unlawful access to a work, they are not concerned with the
^ Id. at 689.
"'"
1 12 Stat 2860, § 1201 (3) (b) (1).
'*" Nimmer, st^ra note 392, at 689.
"'2 Id. at 689.
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circumvention of copyright protection. Conversely, the "additional violations" provision
is not implicated during the initial act of gaining unlawful access. It is concerned with the
circumvention of copyright protection afforded by technology, through the use of devices
offered to the public. The actual issue of copyright infringement would still be regulated
by the provisions of the Copyright Statute, but the issue of the public offering of devices
to circumvent copyright protection would be encompassed by the "additional violations"
provision. It is worth mentioning that a person who engages in copyright infringement of
a work to which he has obtained lawful access, does not violate any of these anti-
circumvention measures,'*^^ although he may be penalized under the Copyright Statute.
Under the DMCA, the circumvention of a technological measure includes
descrambling a scrambled work, and decrypting an encrypted work, without the authority
of the copyright owner.'*''* Further, the intentional removal or alteration of any copyright
management information or the provision of false copyright management information used
in connection with copies of a work, a phonorecord or a performance of a work, is also
prohibited.'*'^ Copyright management information means:
any of the following information conveyed in connection with copies or
phonorecords of a work or performances or displays of a work, including in digital
form, except that such term does not include any personally identifying information
about a user of a work or of a copy, phonorecord, performance, or display of a
work: (1) the title and other information identifying the work, including the
information set forth on a notice of copyright; (2) the name of, and other
identifying information about, the author of a work; (3) the name of, and other
"'^ Id. at 689.
^'M 12 Stat 2860 at §1201 (3) (A).
"'^ Id. at §1202 (b) (1) and (3) (c).
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identifying information about, the copyright owner of the work, including the
information set forth in a notice of copyright; (4) with the exception of public
performances of works by radio and television broadcast stations, the name of, and
other identifying information about, a performer whose performance is fixed in a
work other than an audiovisual work; (5) with the exception of public
performances of works by radio and television broadcast stations, in the case of an
audiovisual work, the name of, and other identifying information about, a writer,
performer, or director who is credited in the audiovisual work/"^
The provision does not prohibit lawfully authorized activities of law enforcement,
intelligence and other government agents,'*^^ and liability is limited in certain prescribed
analog and digital transmissions.''*^ With respect to the MP3 technology, a source of
concern for the music industry is that the MP3 technology does not contain a copyright
management system, making it virtually impossible to trace infiingers or the number of
unauthorized copies of copyrighted materials."**^
With respect to the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA, the prohibitions
do not "affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infiingement,
including fair use, under this title."'*^" The anti-circumvention provision also prescribes
specified exemptions to its provisions, including an exemption in favor of nonprofit
libraries, archives and educational institutions.'*^* There are also exemptions for law
enforcement, intelligence and other government activities, and such other "fair uses" ofa
'"'^ Mat §1202 (c)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5).
'"^ Mat §1202 (d).
"'* Id. at §1202 (e) (1) and (2) .
""' WendyM Pollack, Note, Timing In: The Future ofCopyright Protection For Online Music in the
Digital Mllenium, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 2445, 2450 (2000).
"2"
1 12 Stat 2860, §1201 (3) (2) (c) (1).
''^' David Nimmer, A RiffOn Fair Use In the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 673,
700 (2000).
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work such as reverse engineering of a lawfully obtained copy of a computer program, and
activities engaged in for the purpose of encryption research. However, it should be noted
that these exemptions do not apply equally to the "basic provision," the "ban on trafficking
provision" and the "additional violations provision."^^
It is suggested that three significant features of the anti-circumvention provision of
the DMCA are: (1) violation of its provisions is distinct from copyright infringement
under the U.S. Copyright Statute, (2) by virtue of such distinction, the anti-circumvention
provision does not affect traditional limitations or defenses to copyright infringement,
including the fair use doctrine, and (3) recognized "fair use" activities such as the use by
non-profit libraries and institutions, reverse engineering and encryption research are
safeguarded.
However, it can be argued that the practical effect of the anti-circumvention
provision of the DMCA, is that it has served to strengthen the monopoly of the copyright
owner, and diminish the value of other types of "fair uses" of a copyrighted work that
have not been specifically set out in the legislation. This result is achieved by the
copyright owner being afforded the statutory privilege of restricting access by the public
to the work (barring the exceptions prescribed in the statutory provision), through the use
of technological measures.
422
1 12 Stat 2860, §1201. See also Nimmer, siqjra note 421, at 700-01.
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Such restriction of access to the protected work may occur even if the desired objective is
to perform acts that may be considered lawful under the Copyright Statute/^
Two popular technological methods that are being utilized by copyright owners to
restrict or deter access to their work are: (1) digital watermarking (steganography)'*^'*
and (2) encryption technology (cryptography).'*^^ Steganography is the science dealing
with encoding digitized information with attributes which cannot be disassociated from the
file containing the information, and digital watermarking is encompassed within this
science."*^^ Digital watermarking is commonly used on paper currency. Its basic function
is to encode information about the author, the copyright date and authorized uses of the
material, in the digital format.'*^^ Digital watermarks are invisible when viewing a digitized
image and inaudible when listening to a digitized sound recording. They become
recognizable only with the use of appropriate software,'*^* and when used in conjunction
with internet tracking tools known as spiders, copyright owners can trace online
infringers.^2^
While the use of digital watermarks does not deter copyright infringement, an
intentional attempt to delete such marks results in the degradation of the quality of the
*^ Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation For the "Digital Millenium", 23 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts
137, 141 (1999).
*^* Rosemarie F. Jcmes, Comment, JVet Footprints? Digital Watermarks: A Trail To the Copyright
Infringer On the Internet, 26 Pepp. L. Rev. 559, 568 (1999).
"'^^ Ewan Kirk, Encryption and Competition in the Information Society, I.P.Q. 1999, 1, 37-55, 37.
*^^ Jones, supra note 424, at 568.
^^' Wendy M. Pollack, Note, Tuning In: The Future ofCopyright Protection For Online Music in the
Digital Millenium, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 2445, 2451 (2000).
^^* Jones, supra note 424, at 569.
"2' Pollack, supra note 427, at 2451.
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work.''^° In addition, a copyright owner can trace the source of an unauthoritzed copy of a
work protected with a digital watermark, which can expose the user to legal liability.'*^'
Digital watermarks can also deter counterfeiters from making illegal copies because an
imitation can be distinguished from the original/^^ Digital watermarks can also provide
important contact information about the author of a protected work such as his name and
e-mail address,"*^^ thus being used as a marketing tool/^
Another protective technological measure that can be used is encryption or the
science of cryptography. This consists of scrambling data through the use ofmathematical
methods which can be followed in reverse to unscramble the data."*^^ This method was
originally used exclusively by the government to protect confidential information, but is
now being widely used by the private industry.'*^*^ It operates like an electronic lock, and
can prevent persons who do not possess the correct "key", or password from gaining
access to the encrypted information.'*"'^
"^^ Jcnes, supra note 424, at 569.
"^^ A/ at 569
"" Id. at 569.
"^'/c^ at 570.
"^ /J at 571.
'•^^/<iat572.
^^'' David Balaban, Music In the Digital hfillenium: The Effects ofthe Digital Millenium Copyright Act of
1998, 7 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 311, 321 (2000).
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The difficulty faced with the encryption method is that should a hacker intentionally break
the lock and decrypt the encoded information, the decrypting software,'*^^ including the
correct key or password,'*^^ can then be made widely available.
Use of the encryption method generally requires the payment of a single fee for a
single use of the encrypted work, that is, a pay-per-use system. Technologies such as
digital envelopes and digital wallets use the encryption method for prohibiting access to a
copyrighted work. Digital envelopes operate in a similar manner to a locked box. In
order to gain access to the "box", the user must pay a single fee. With respect to access
to sound recordings on the internet, the user may pay a one-time listening fee, or a twenty-
four-hour period listening fee. In the alternative, the user must purchase a copy of the
sound recording online.'*^ Digital wallets employ the same system, but the amount of the
required payments for use of material encoded in a digital wallet is much smaller, so that it
can cost pennies to access a song for a one-time listening license.'*^^
It is recognized that the use of encryption technology can have serious
consequences for the development of copyright law in the digital age, as it has the
potential to prohibit access to works that may have fallen into the public domain. For
example, digital envelopes employ a method known as "persistent encryption," which
means that the content is decrypted and accessible only while specific authorized users are
"^^ Jones, supra note 424, at 572.
"^^ Balaban, supra note 437, at 321.
^ Pollack, supra note 427, at 2451.
'^'
Id. at 2452.
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using it for the amount of time for which they have lawfully gained access. One
consequence of this method is that a work in which copyright has expired, can remain
inaccessible'*^'^ ifthe relevant pay-per-use license fee is not paid or has been exhausted.
One hypothetical situation which has been envisioned is where a publisher can take
an old cookbook which may have fallen into the public domain, add some original
material, claim copyright in the newly released whole, and then encode the work in a
digital envelope. The result is that the work is effectively placed under lock and key and
the publisher can charge a fee for gaining access to a work that was initially taken from the
public domain.^^
In such a scenario, it can be argued that the fair use doctrine is rendered effectively
meaningless. As previously discussed, the fair use defense under the Copyright Statute is
raised after copyright infringement has occurred. The anti-circumvention provision of the
DMCA allows this provision of the Copyright Statute to remain intact. However, the
DMCA does not apply the fair use defense (barring the prescribed statutory exceptions) to
a prohibited act of anti-circumvention.''^ In that situation, it is the initial act of access to
the copyrighted work, protected by a technological measure, which is prohibited, as the
issue of alleged copyright infringement has not yet arisen.
^^ Id. at 2452.
^^ David Nimmer, A RiffOn Fair Use In the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 673,
712-13(2000).
'^ Mat 731.
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Whether or not the act ofcircumvention was to make a "fair use" ofthe work is irrelevant,
as the copyright owner has been given free rein to place his work under lock and key.
These issues were explored in two recent cases that arose under the provisions of
the DMCA. In the case of RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc.,'*^^ the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant had violated the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions. The
plaintiff developed software to enable owners of audio and video content to send their
products to online consumers in an encoded format, with the aid of streaming technology.
The defendant developed three products, the Streambox VCR, the Ripper and the Ferret
which circumvented the authentication security measures encoded on the plaintiffs
software, and allowed end-users to access and download copies of the streamed files.
One of the defenses raised by the defendant was that their Streambox VCR had
legitimate uses and allowed the user to make a fair use of the encoded files. The
defendant therefore argued that the Sony decision was applicable.**^ The District Court
rejected this argument on two grounds. First, the court held that the Sony decision turned
to a large extent on the finding that substantial numbers of copyright holders who
broadcast their works either had authorized or did not object to their works being time-
shifted. By contrast, the owners of the copyrighted content in the case at hand had
deliberately sought to encode their products. ''^^ Secondly, the Sony decision did not
involve an interpretation of the DMCA, since under the DMCA:
*^^ No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1889, (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
^ Id. at *2\-22.
'"^
Jd. at *22.
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product developers do not have the right to distribute products that circumvent
technological measures that prevent consumers from gaining unauthorized access
to or making unauthorized copies of works protected by the Copyright Act.
Instead, Congress specifically prohibited the distribution ofthe tools by which such
circumvention could be accomplished."*^^
The decision in RealNetworks, emphasizes the fact that violation of the provisions
of the DMCA remains separate and distinct from violations of the provisions of the
Copyright Statute. While the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA expressly states
that the fair use doctrine is not affected by its provisions, it is suggested that in reality, the
fair use doctrine is imdermined by the legislation as a copyright holder is now authorized
to prohibit the initial access to his work through the use of technology, whether or not the
intended use is a "fair use." By extension, the fair use doctrine which can only be relied on
after the issue of copyright infringement has been raised, is virtually shut out because the
initial act of accessing a work through the use of a circumvention method, has been
forbidden.
In the case of Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,'*^^ eight U.S. motion
picture studios used an encryption system called CSS to prohibit access to their films,
which were distributed on digital versatile disks (DVDs). The effect of the CSS
encryption system was that the movies on the DVDs could only be viewed on players and
computer drives that were equipped with decryption technology, licensed by the copyright
'^^ Id. at *22.
'^M 1 1 F.Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
123
holders, to decrypt and play (but not copy) the movies."*^" A fifteen-year old Norwegian
computer hacker reverse engineered a DVD player and discovered the CSS encryption
code and "key". This information was then used to create a program called DeCSS, used
to decrypt, encrypted DVDs. The defendant made the DeCSS program available for
download by the public on its website, and the plaintiffs sought to enjoin fiirther posting of
DeCSS, in accordance with the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA,
One of the defenses raised by the defendant was the fair use doctrine. The
defendant argued that the DMCA could not be properly construed to make it difficult or
impossible to make any fair use of the copyrighted movies, and that the DMCA did not
reach their activities, which enabled users of DeCSS to make fair uses of the copyrighted
works."*^' The court rejected this argimient, and held that the defense of fair use was
inapplicable to an action for the infringement of the anti-circumvention provision of the
DMCA.^'^
The court observed that in drafting the legislation. Congress had taken into
consideration the legitimate fair use concerns of interested parties by: (1) limiting the anti-
circumvention provision to the act itself and not to consequent actions of a person who
has gained authorized access to a copyrighted work; (2) delaying the effective date of the
anti-circumvention provision for two years while fair use concerns were addressed; (3)
creating a host of exceptions to aspects of the anti-circumvention provision that Congress
'*5<'Mat303.
"^^ Id. at 322.
'•^2
Id. at 322.
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thought "fair", including reverse engineering, security testing, good faith encryption
research, and certain uses by non-profit libraries, archives and educational institutions.'*^^
The court also held that Sony was inapplicable to questions of liability under the
DMCA, since Sony's construction of the Copyright Statute "has been overruled by the
later enactment of the DMCA to the extent of any inconsistency between Sony and the
new statute."^^'* The court's analysis of the effect of the DMCA on the Sony decision, is
at least arguable, since Sony and the DMCA address different concerns. Sony concerned
the issue of copyright infringement through the use of an "infringing" device which was
capable of substantial non-infringing uses. Conversely, the DMCA addresses activities
which touch upon the circumvention of protective measures used for copyrighted works.
In light of this distinction, it may not be wholly accurate to adopt the position that because
of this difference the DMCA has overruled Sony where inconsistent. However, the court
did recognize the fundamental impact wrought by the DMCA on U.S. copyright law when
it noted that by:
prohibiting the provision of circumvention technology, the DMCA fundamentally
altered the landscape. A given device or piece of technology might have "a
substantial non-infringing use," and hence be immune from attack under Sony's
construction of the Copyright Act but nonetheless still be subject to suppression
under Section 1201 the fact that Congress elected to leave technologically
unsophisticated persons who wish to make fair use of encrypted copyrighted
works without the technical means of doing so is a matter for Congress....'*^^
*" Id. at 323.
"^^ Id. at 323.
'•^ Id. at 323-4.
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In other words, it is suggested that the DMCA added to the rights afforded to
copyright owners under the Copyright Statute, by allowing them the additional privilege of
limiting access to their work through technological measures. Notwithstanding the fact
that a potential user may wish to bypass these technological measures to make a fair use of
the technologically-secured work, unless the potential use is limited to the prescribed "fair
uses" allowed by the DMCA, the user who flouts the technological measures or the person
who assists him in so doing, would have violated the provisions of the legislation. The
license granted to copyright owners to restrict public access to their work, has been given
legislative validity by the U.S. Congress.
Trinidad and Tobago has not yet ratified the WIPO Copyright Treaty or the WIPO
Performances Treaty.'*^^ However, this does not mean that Trinidad and Tobago
legislators are not seeking to keep abreast of international technological developments and
legislation for the digital age. New pieces of legislation have been enacted or proposed, to
meet the challenges created by developments in electronic commerce technology.'*^^ The
new legislation includes the Computer Misuse Act, 2000 and the Telecommunications Bill,
2001, the latter not yet having been enacted.
"^ http://www.wipo.org/treaties/docs/english/u-page31.doc (last visited May 9, 2001).
*^^ Curtis Rampersad, Maharaj: We Must Keep Abreast ofChanging Technology, Trinidad Express, May
30, 2001, available at http://209.94. 197.2/htmll/prev/may01/may30/b3.htm (last visited June 10, 2001) -
quoting from an address by the Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj, at
a breakfast seminar hosted by the Trinidad and Tobago Manufacturer's Association on developments in
information technology.
126
The Computer Misuse Act, 2000, makes it an ofiFence for any person to gain
unauthorized access to a computer or a program or data held in a computer, if the person
gaining access is not entitled to control access of the kind in question, or does not have
consent to access the kind of program or data in question from the person who is entitled
to control access.'*^^ The objective of this Act can be compared with the objective of the
DMCA in the U.S. context. Both pieces of legislation allow the creator of the protected
work to restrict access through the use of technological measures, whether or not the
objective ofthe user is to make a legitimate or "fair" use ofthe protected work.
The Telecommunications Bill of Trinidad and Tobago, 2001, was introduced to
Parliament to de-monopolize the telecommunications industry which is controlled by the
lone telecommunications provider, the Telecommunications Services of Trinidad and
Tobago (TSTT). It is anticipated that one result of opening up the internet market, would
be to keep Trinidad and Tobago in touch with technological developments in the
international arena. It is therefore logical to assume that Trinidad and Tobago will soon
join some of its larger metropolitan neighbors, like the U.S., in ratifying the WIPO
Treaties and implementing its provisions in domestic legislation, in order that legislative
support would be provided for technological progress.
^^* Denise Daniel, Computer Misuse Now a Serious Offence, Trinidad Guardian, June 12, 2001, available
at http://\vww.guardian.co.tt/bussguardian2.html (last visited June 12, 2001).
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
On June 5, 2001, Napster, Inc. signed a licensing deal with the RIAA that would
allow it to ofiFer copyrighted music to its subscribers for a fee. Napster, Inc. will obtain
the music from MusicNet, a company which offers its licensees downloadable and
streamed music and music videos. This company is owned by RealNetworks, Warner
Music group, EMI Recorded Music and Bertelsmann's BMG Entertainment. Napster,
Inc. plans to offer its new fee-charging service by the summer of 2001. '^^^
It seems that the RIAA has scored not only a legal victory as a result of the
decision in the Napster litigation, but it also scored an economic victory as it plans to use
access to Napster, Inc.'s music files "as leverage to advance their own online jukebox
systems."'*^ However, while the problems encountered with the Napster technology
appear to be over for the RIAA, new and more threatening technologies are constantly
being developed and perfected, which raise even more uncertain legal issues than those
raised in the Napster litigation.
Two new technologies already widely used, could further undermine the RIAA's
grip on the U.S. music industry. These are the Gnutella and Freenet software. Gnutella is
''^' Napster Goes Legit, available at,
http://dailynews.yahoo.eom/h/eo/20010606/en/napsterjgoes_legit_l.html (last visited June 6, 2001).
*^ Napster Goes Legit, available at
http://dailynews.yahoo.eom/h/eo/20010606/en/napsterjgoes_legit_l.html, (last visited June 6, 2001).
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a program that was written by Justin Frankel, a former employee of Nullsoft, a subsidiary
of America Online,'*^* and is freely available for download from the internet. Like the
Napster technology, the Gnutella software facilitates peer-to-peer sharing of information
while users are online.'*^^ However, a fimdamental difference between the Gnutella and
Napster software is that the Gnutella program is a decentralized network, directly
connecting users, without the need for an intermediary centralized server.'*^^ In addition,
Gnutella users are not limited to searching for MP3 music files, but can search for other
types of files including movies and text documents."*^
The legal dilemma posed by the Gnutella program for copyright owners is that
there is no single corporate entity or person that can be sued for contributory or vicarious
copyright infringement, as the program is not officially owned by any one entity. Instead it
is an application that is maintained by many loose-knit, non-profit entities, and is freely
available on the internet.'*^' While Napster, Inc. as an incorporated company, enabled the
RIAA to sue the company instead of initiating legal action against the millions of
individual users, the Gnutella program creates litigation problems as there is no corporate
or other legal entity that can be sued, barring the millions of potential Gnutella users.
^^ Damien A. Riehl, Electronic Commerce In the 21st Century: Peer-to-Peer Distribution Systems: Will
Napster, Gnutella, and Freenet Create a Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev.
1761, 1774(2001).
^^ Id. ai 1776.
'^^ Mat 1775-6.
"^ Id. at 1776.
'^^M at 1776-7.
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Another peer-to-peer system that is widely available on the internet is the Freenet
program that was created by a United Kingdom programmer, Ian Clarke.'*^ This program
also features a decentralized network like the Gnutella program, but it is arguably more
threatening to copyright holders than both the Napster and Gnutella software, because it
was designed to efifectively conceal the source of information passing through its
system."*^^ This poses a virtually impossible task for copyright owners to trace and identify
the relevant party to be sued for copyright infringement.'*** In addition, like Gnutella, the
Freenet program has no physical presence on the internet beyond its software, so that
there is no identifiable corporate body or other entity behind the software product.'**^
It is suggested that these technologies pose an even greater risk for the RIAA and
other copyright owners in the digital age, and it will be interesting to see how copyright
infringement will be addressed when the Gnutella and Freenet technologies are implicated.
One fact which is undisputed is that technology is fast outstripping traditional legal
rights. The only feasible solution to the problem appears to be the current trend adopted
by policy makers and legislators to strengthen the copyright owner's legal rights, whether
or not the result is detrimental to the public interest. No longer can it reasonably be
argued that U.S. copyright laws are seeking to balance the interests of copyright owners
and users, as the balance is clearly tipped in favor ofcopyright owners. While this reality
'^/c/. at 1779.
"^^ Mat 1779-80.
'^^Mat 1782.
^^ Id. al\7S7.
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may be necessary to combat the effects of technological progress, it has permanently
changed the landscape of U.S. copyright law and may see the demise of traditional
limitations on copyright, such as the Fair Use doctrine.
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